Confronting Crawford v. Washington in the Lower Courts by Keenan, Dylan O
DYLAN 0. KEENAN
Confronting Crawford v. Washington in the
Lower Courts
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decision of the last decade. Critics have argued that the Crawford line is a doctrinal muddle that
has led to arbitrary and unpredictable results in the lower courts. I respond to this critique by
presenting results from the first large-scale empirical analysis of post-Crawford Confrontation
Clause cases in the lower courts. The results show that courts have emphasized two factors -the
presence of a state actor and the presence of an injured party-to evaluate whether a statement is
testimonial under Crawford. I then argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom, these results are
not ambiguous or contradictory but instead consistent with the reasoning of Crawford and the
underlying purposes of the Confrontation Clause.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decisions in Crawford v. Washington' and its progeny
reshaped Confrontation Clause doctrine. Repudiating the Court's earlier focus
on the reliability of out-of-court hearsay, Crawford held that the Confrontation
Clause' provides defendants with a right to cross-examine only those
declarants who made "testimonial" out-of-court statements.4 The Court did
not, however, comprehensively define testimonial statements in either
Crawford or any of its subsequent Confrontation Clause opinions.' Most
academics and lower courts consider Crawford's reformulation of
Confrontation Clause doctrine to be a radical one.6 A minority argues that
Crawford did not depart quite so substantially from the pre-Crawford doctrine.7
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. Compare id. at 51 ("The constitutional text, like the history underlying the common-law
right of confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute concern with . . . 'testimonial'
statements . . . ."), Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) ("In Crawford v.
Washington, we held that [the Confrontation Clause] bars 'admission of testimonial
statements . . . .' (citation omitted) (quoting 541 U.S. at 53-54)), and Whorton v. Bockting,
549 U.S. 4o6, 420 (2007) ("Under Crawford ... the Confrontation Clause has no application
to [out-of-court nontestimonial] statements and therefore permits their admission even if
they lack indicia of reliability."), with Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (holding that
when a hearsay declarant is unavailable for trial, "his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate 'indicia of reliability"'), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . .
4. See infra Section I.B.
5. See infra Sections I.B-D.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Brito, 427 F-3d 53, 55 (ist Cit. 2005) ("Crawford ... effected a sea
change in the jurisprudence of the Confrontation Clause . . . ."); Anderson v. Jackson, 567 F.
Supp. 2d 973, 982 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (characterizing Crawford's interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause as a "radical transformation"); People v. Pirwani, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673,
688 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Crawford radically alters the way we analyze claims of error under the
Confrontation Clause . . . ."); State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 322 (Md. 2005) (stating that
Crawford "fundamentally altered" Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence);
Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of
Witnesses, 39 U. RiCH. L. REv. 511, 626 (2005) ("After Crawford, the world of confrontation
law has been radically altered."); Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court
Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, CRUM. JUST., Summer 2004, at 4, S (stating
that Crawford "radically transformed" Confrontation Clause doctrine).
7. See, e.g., Charles F. Baird, The Confrontation Clause: Why Crawford v. Washington Does
Nothing More than Maintain the Status Quo, 47 S. TEx. L. REv. 305, 320-24 (2005) (arguing
that Crawford "guarantees the status quo -the continued admission of statements that the
Confrontation Clause was meant to exclude," because it fails to define "testimonial
statements" while vesting discretion in judges to decide which statements reach the jury);
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The descriptive debate about the consequences of Crawford is supplemented by
a lively debate about the normative desirability and legal reasoning of the
decision.8 Despite those disagreements, scholars generally agree that Crawford's
stated doctrine is vague and that lower courts have struggled to apply it.
Mark Dwyer, Crawford's "Testimonial Hearsay" Category: A Plain Limit on the Protections of
the Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 277 (2005) (arguing that based on a careful
parsing of the case, "nothing in Crawford justifies this hope that virtually all hearsay
statements are still within the reach of the Confrontation Clause"); John R. Grimm, Note, A
Wavering Bright Line: How Crawford v. Washington Denies Defendants a Consistent
Confrontation Right, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 185, 205-11 (2011) (using the examples of 911 calls
and medical diagnoses to argue that Crawford's amorphous test will yield largely similar
results to those arising under Ohio v. Roberts); cf Lisa Kern Griffin, Circling Around the
Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach but Not a Robust Right, 105 MIcH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 16, 19-21 (20o6) (arguing that although Crawford facilitates much broader
application of confrontation rights, those rights are hollow because other decisions have
weakened the meaning of confrontation itself). Other commentators have argued that while
Crawford held the potential to provide defendants with more robust confrontation rights,
subsequent decisions have neutered that potential. See, e.g., Michael D. Cicchini, Dead
Again: The Latest Demise of the Confrontation Clause, 8o FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1312-17 (2011)
(arguing that the Court's decision in Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011), undermined
Crawford by reintroducing issues of reliability into Confrontation Clause analysis through
the use of the rules of evidence to determine whether statements are testimonial).
8. Many critics of Crawford argue that the decision will undermine domestic violence
prosecutions. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv.
747, 749-50 (2005) ("[W]ithin days-even hours-of the Crawford decision, prosecutors
were dismissing or losing hundreds of domestic violence cases that would have presented
little difficulty in the past. . . . In a survey of over 60 prosecutors' offices ... 63 percent of
respondents reported the Crawford decision has significantly impeded prosecutions of
domestic violence." (footnotes omitted)). But see Michael Baxter, Note, The Impact of Davis
v. Washington on Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 29 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 213, 226 (2008)
("While the Davis decision is not the most satisfying for those who seek strong domestic
violence prosecutions, it certainly does not terribly hinder the use of most effective and
traditional forms of hearsay for domestic violence, namely the 911 call and excited
utterance."). Other critics argue that Crawford's originalist analysis of the Confrontation
Clause is inaccurate. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Not "The Framers' Design": How the
Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis "Testimonial"
Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 349, 434 (2007)
("Hence, however 'reasonable' the originalist inferences that Justice Scalia drew in Crawford
might have appeared when viewed in isolation, they collide head-on with the evidentiary
doctrine that actually shaped the Framers' understanding of the confrontation right.
Admitting unsworn, 'nontestimonial' hearsay was not part of 'the Framers' design."'
(footnote omitted)). But see Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal
Procedure: The Triumph ofJustice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO.
L.J. 183, 192 (2005) ("Crawford was a successful blend of originalism and formalism....
[Crawford's] formalistic rule is not only clear, but also rooted in the historical record, giving
it objective legitimacy. It serves the historical goal of constraining judicial discretion and
testing evidence before jurors' eyes. And there is no easy way to evade the rule .... .").
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In this Note, I focus on that final problem: the ambiguity of Crawford-line
decisions. Crawford announced a new rule for evaluating Confrontation Clause
challenges, but it offered three different tests for applying the rule.'
Subsequent decisions added a fourth test but failed to eliminate any of the
original ambiguity.'o Not surprisingly, scholarly "[c]riticism of Crawford's
ambiguity abounds."" The Crawford line has been described as "vague[]," 2
"uncertain,"" "unpredictable, a "mess," 5  "almost arbitrary, ,
"incoherent,"1 7  and "an exercise in fiction."'" These descriptions appear
reasonable. To apply Crawford, lower courts must decide whether a statement
is testimonial. Yet the Court has repeatedly refused to define testimonial
statements, and has instead gestured towards certain "clues" that might
indicate whether a statement is testimonial.' 9 Lower-court splits lend credence
to these critiques. In the immediate wake of Crawford, states and circuits split
9. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004); see infra Section I.B.
io. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2oo6) (stating the "primary purpose" definition of
a testimonial statement); see infra Sections I.C-D; see also Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1153 n.2 ("We
noted in Crawford . . . that '[j]ust as various definitions of "testimonial" exist, one can
imagine various definitions of "interrogation," and we need not select among them in this
case.' Davis did not abandon those qualifications; nor do we do so here." (citation
omitted)); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial."').
ii. Josephine Ross, After Crawford Double-Speak: "Testimony" Does Not Mean Testimony and
"Witness" Does Not Mean Witness, 97 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 149 (20o6). Some
scholars have argued that this ambiguity undermines Crawford's effectiveness in protecting
criminal defendants. See, e.g., Grimm, supra note 7, at 190, 205-o8, 210-11.
12. Michael D. Cicchini, Judicial (In)Discretion: How Courts Circumvent the Confrontation Clause
Under Crawford and Davis, 75 TENN. L. REV. 753, 764-67 (2008) (arguing that the ambiguity
of the Crawford tests has left them open to manipulation by lower courts).
13. Andrew Etter, Comment, Embracing Crawford: The Rights ofDefendants and Children Under
the Confrontation Clause, 77 U. CIN. L. REv. 1167, 1176 (2009).
14. Clifford S. Fishman, Confrontation, Forfeiture, and Giles v. California: An Interim User's
Guide, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 750 (2009).
is. Deborah Ahrens & John Mitchell, Don't Blame Crawford or Bryant: The Confrontation Clause
Mess Is All Davis's Fault, 39 RUTGERS L. REc. 104,105 (2012).
16. Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence Cases After Davis: Is the Glass HalfEmpty or HafFull?, 15
J.L. & POL'Y 759, 775-76 (2007).
17. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIz. L. REv. 8oi, 832 n.173 (2007).
i8. Cicchini, supra note 7, at 1316-17 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1167 (2011)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
ig. People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019, 1026 (N.Y. 2008) (distinguishing the Crawford line's
varying "formulations" of testimonial statements from the "clues" to help determine
whether a statement is testimonial).
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on how to apply Crawford in common circumstances: 911 phone calls,2 o
statements by children," and forensic analyses." This criticism only intensified
in the wake of Michigan v. Bryant" and Williams v. Illinois," two of the Court's
most recent Confrontation Clause cases.
This Note challenges the conventional wisdom about Crawford's vagueness
through a rare large-scale empirical analysis of post-Crawford decisions.
Although the Supreme Court's doctrine is quite muddled, 6 this Note presents
empirical evidence that lower courts have reached predictable and consistent
20. Compare People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Crim. Ct. 2004) (holding a 911 call to be
nontestimonial), with People v. Cortes, 7 81 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding a 911 call
to be testimonial).
21. Compare State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255-56 (Minn. 2oo6) (concluding that under
the objective observer test a child witness's statement was nontestimonial), with People v.
Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 753, 758 n.3 (Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that, in the case of a child
witness's statement, the Crawford "objective witness" is not "an objective four year old").
22. Compare Martin v. State, 936 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 20o6) (holding a laboratory
report was testimonial), with Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005)
(holding certificates of analysis were nontestimonial).
23. 131 S. Ct. 1143.
24. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
25. There are a few empirical analyses of the post-Crawford Confrontation Clause. See Donald
A. Dripps, On Reach and Grasp in Criminal Procedure: Crawford in California, 37 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 349 (2011) (classifying recent California Confrontation Clauses cases
by outcome and reasoning); Josephine Ross, Crawford's Short-Lived Revolution: How
Davis v. Washington Reins in Crawford's Reach, 83 N.D. L. REV. 387, 460 (2007) (classifying
post-Crawford, pre-Davis cases by the line of reasoning courts used to classify excited
utterances as nontestimonial); Eleanor Simon, Confrontation and Domestic Violence Post-
Davis: Is There and Should There Be a Doctrinal Exception?, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 175, 185-
99 (20n) (conducting an empirical analysis of 137 statements in eighty-two cases to
determine whether there was a de facto "Domestic Violence 'Exception"' to the
Crawjord/Davis line). This Note is distinct from each of these analyses. Dripps focuses
exclusively on California courts. His chief concern is federalism and state interests, rather
than compliance by lower courts. Most importantly, his method depends on a subjective
evaluation of the quality of each opinion's reasoning. Rather than classifying and evaluating
opinions based on objective facts about each case, Dripps applies his own subjective
judgment about whether each opinion is consistent with Crawford. See Dripps, supra, at 373-
81. Ross's article categorizes state court decisions by their Confrontation Clause doctrine-
for example, whether the decisions employ a primary purpose or a formality test-but Ross
neither analyzes how the facts of those cases influence outcomes nor conducts any statistical
analysis. See Ross, supra, at 460. Simon's analysis is empirical, large-scale, quantitative, and
objective. But Simon focuses exclusively on domestic violence cases, and she does not
present an overarching theory of the Confrontation Clause.
26. See infra Sections I.B-D.
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results in Confrontation Clause cases. This evidence shows that lower courts
effectively employ a two-step process. First, lower courts almost never apply
the Confrontation Clause to statements not made to a state actor, finding that
such statements are nontestimonial under Crawford. Second, lower courts are
much less likely to find even statements to state actors to be testimonial when
those statements are made in the context of a medical emergency.
After presenting the results of my empirical analysis, I argue that this two-
step approach to Confrontation Clause cases is not only consistent but also
defensible. First, consistency among lower courts refites common claims that
Crawford's doctrinal uncertainty borders on arbitrariness, leading to irrational
and inconsistent decisions. Second, lower courts have converged on a
doctrinally and textually grounded interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.
Their framing reflects the underlying aims of the Clause, and the animating
concerns of Crawford.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I describes the Confrontation Clause
before and after Crawford. Part II describes my method of analysis, including
the data I collected and the method of multiple logistic regression. Part III
argues from my analysis that Crawford in the lower courts is not the mess that
some commentators have claimed. I conclude by suggesting that lower courts
have made sense of Crawford, despite its muddled doctrine, by applying the
Confrontation Clause to limit the state's coercive investigatory power.
I. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE DOCTRINE BEFORE AND AFTER CRAWFORD
This Part describes the Court's Confrontation Clause doctrine before and
after Crawford. The Court has refined the concept of "testimonial" hearsay
through both dictionary-style definitions and factors that help courts apply
those definitions. The Court has declined to choose among these sometimes-
contradictory definitions, and it has failed to specify any relationship between
factors and definitions or to prioritize particular factors. I hope to highlight the
resulting complexity of the Court's present doctrine. The Court's main tests
remain uncertain and cryptic, implying contradictory results when applied to
particular fact patterns.
27. See infra Parts II, III.
28. See infra Part III.
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A. The Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation Before Crawford
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him."" Courts have not faced great difficulty in
applying the Confrontation Clause to statements made in court.30 For example,
suppose that A is on trial for murder. B testifies at A's trial that he saw A
commit the murder. The Confrontation Clause guarantees that A will have the
opportunity to know B's identity, to be present when B testifies, and to cross-
examine B about his statements." There is no plausible way to define "witness"
under which B is not a witness against A."
Applying the Confrontation Clause to out-of-court statements presents
courts with a more challenging problem." Under the most restrictive reading,
the Confrontation Clause does not apply to any out-of-court statements . The
restrictive reading of the Clause finds support in a narrow definition of the word
"witness." If one defines a witness as a person testifying against the accused at
trial, then the plain language of the Clause limits its application to in-court
statements." At the other extreme, one might extend the Clause's reach to cover
29. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
30. See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEo. L.J. 1011,
1011-12 (1998) ("For the most part, however, the boundaries of the confrontation right as
applied to trial witnesses are tolerably clear.").
31. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1985) (noting that while the "literal right to
confront the witness at the time of trial . . . forms the core of the values furthered by the
Confrontation Clause," the Confrontation Clause also guarantees a right to cross-examine
the witness (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Dwain White, Note, Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), 47 TEX. L.
REV. 331, 334 (1969) ("There has always been general agreement among courts and
commentators that the primary right encompassed within the constitutional guarantee of
confrontation was that of cross-examination.").
32. See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEo. L.J. 641, 647 (1996)
(discussing the meaning of a "witness" in the Sixth Amendment).
33. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) ("The Constitution's text does not
alone resolve this case."); Friedman, supra note 3o, at 1012 ("The more pervasive perplexity
arises [when] ... the declarant herself... does not testify at trial.").
34. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-43 (citing Woodsides v. State, 3 Miss. 655, 664-65 (1837)).
Crawford, of course, rejects this view. Id. at So-51 ("Accordingly, we once again
reject the view that the Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-court
testimony. . .. ").
3S. See id. at 42-43; cf Amar, supra note 32, at 692 ("In ordinary language, when witness A takes
the stand and testifies about what her best friend B told her out of court, A is the witness,
not B."). Professor Amar ultimately endorses a slightly broader definition of "witness," one
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all statements introduced at trial, whether or not they were first made outside of
the court.3* Most courts and commentators believe that the actual reach of the
Confrontation Clause lies somewhere between these two extremes, covering
some but not all out-of-court statements. Because the text of the Clause does
not resolve these disputes (it creates them), the scope of a defendant's
confrontation rights depends on the historical meaning of the Clause.
If the Confrontation Clause applies to some nonexhaustive subset of out-
of-court statements, how is this subset defined? In Ohio v. Roberts, the
Supreme Court first attempted to define the boundaries of this subset- that is,
to specify exactly those out-of-court statements to which the Confrontation
Clause applies. 9 In Roberts, the Court adopted a two-prong test for admitting
out-of-court statements in a manner consistent with the Confrontation
Clause.40 First, the declarant of the statement must be unavailable to testify at
trial.4 1 Second, the statement must meet a threshold test of reliability, either by
that covers, for example, "videotapes, transcripts, depositions, and affidavits when prepared
for court use and introduced as testimony." Id. at 693.
36. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-43 ("One could plausibly read 'witnesses against' a defendant to
mean ... those whose statements are offered at trial . . . ." (citing 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMElUCAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw
§ 1397, at 104 (2d ed. 1923))). This view is arguably quite close to the views of the Framers.
See Davies, supra note 8, at 352 (" [F] raming-era sources indicate that the confrontation right
itself prohibited the use of hearsay statements as evidence of the defendant's guilt.").
37. See Simon, supra note 25, at 177 ("The Court has always understood witness statements
[subject to the Confrontation Clause] to include in-court testimony as well as some, but not
all, out-of-court hearsay statements."). Compare Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,
182 (1987) (rejecting the view that "the Confrontation Clause could bar the use of any
out-of-court statements when the declarant is unavailable" as "unintended and too extreme"
(quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980))), with Sweta Patel, Comment, The Right
To Submit "Testimony" via 911 Emergency After Crawford v. Washington, 46 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 707, 710 (2006) ("The U.S[.] Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the proposition
that the Confrontation Clause applies only to in-court testimony . . . .").
38. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-43 ("The Constitution's text does not alone resolve this case....
We must therefore turn to the historical background of the Clause to understand its
meaning.").
39. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 567 (2d ed. 2008) ("In the Mattox era, the Supreme Court issued
a number of ad hoc judgments to resolve particular controversies, but made little attempt to
systematize the Confrontation Clause's impact on the admission of hearsay. The Court first
undertook this task in earnest in Ohio v. Roberts." (citation omitted)).
4o. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (summarizing the two requirements of unavailability and reliability
for admitting hearsay without violating the Confrontation Clause).
41. Id. ("[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable."). This
requirement was gradually weakened following Roberts. See Friedman, supra note 30, at 1016
("[T]he Court has cut back drastically on the unequivocal application of the unavailability
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falling within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or by possessing
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.""2 Thus, under Roberts, an out-
of-court statement could be admitted without violating the Confrontation
Clause so long as the declarant was unavailable and the statement was found
by the trial court to be sufficiently reliable.
Roberts was widely criticized. Critics argued that the Roberts doctrine was
unclear and unstable,4 3 insufficiently protective of defendants' rights," and
contrary to the text" and history46 of the Confrontation Clause itself. In a
decision that recapitulated many of these criticisms,4 7 the Court overruled
Roberts in Crawford v. Washington.
requirement."); Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth
Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 561 (1988) ("United States v. Inadi effectively abandoned
Roberts's unavailability branch." (footnote omitted)).
42. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. ("[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination
at trial ... [r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.").
43. See Bibas, supra note 8, at 189 ("Roberts's tests for reliability proved to be murky,
subjective, inconsistent, and unworkable."); Friedman, supra note 30, at 1022 ("[The
Supreme Court's] approach [under Roberts] devalues the Confrontation Clause, treating it
as a constitutionalization of an amorphous and mystifying evidentiary doctrine, the
continuing value of which is widely questioned.").
44. See Jonakait, supra note 41, at 622 (stating that under the Roberts line, "evidence law now
controls the content of the confrontation clause, and the clause now offers an accused little
protection"); Lininger, supra note 8, at 760 (" [T]he 'Roberts test' was not much of a test at
all. . . . Under either [a firmly rooted hearsay exception or the indicia-of-reliability test]
Roberts seemed to abdicate the Supreme Court's responsibility for regulating the admission
of hearsay that could violate a defendant's confrontation rights.").
45. See Amar, supra note 32, at 690-97 (arguing that the Court's Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence has overlooked the plain meaning of the Sixth Amendment by conflating the
word "witness" with an out-of-court declarant under hearsay rules).
46. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History,
27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 167-68 (1995) (attacking the Roberts Court's theory that the
Confrontation Clause is chiefly concerned with producing reliable evidence).
47. Justice Scalia's Crawford opinion refers to the Roberts reliability test as "amorphous,"
541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004), "unpredictab[le]," id., and "[v]ague," id. at 68. Justice Scalia also
argues that the reliability test is contrary to the intent of the Framers. Id. at 61 ("Where
testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth
Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous
notions of 'reliability."'). Finally, Justice Scalia argues that because of its inherent vagueness,
Roberts's reliability test fails to provide "any meaningful protection" in politically charged
cases. Id. at 68 (using the foil of Sir Walter Raleigh's trial).
48. Although the majority does not state explicitly that it overrules Roberts, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence states that the majority does just that. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
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B. Crawford's Reformulation of Confrontation Clause Doctrine
Michael Crawford was convicted of charges stemming from an incident in
which he stabbed a man who tried to rape his wife, Sylvia.49 The police
interviewed Sylvia, who generally corroborated Michael's version of events.s0
Sylvia did, however, state that the victim did not draw a knife before Michael
stabbed him.s' At trial, the State of Washington used Sylvia's tape-recorded
interview to refute Michael's claims of self-defense.s2 Michael invoked
Washington's spousal privilege law to prevent Sylvia from testifying against
him at trial." The trial court held that neither marital privilege nor the
Confrontation Clause barred the prosecution from introducing Sylvia's
recorded out-of-court statements and thus admitted those statements.54
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the recording
failed a nine-factor test for "guarantees of trustworthiness" under Roberts.5
The Washington Supreme Court reinstated Michael's conviction, holding that
Sylvia's tape-recorded statements were reliable under Roberts, even though they
did not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."6
Instead of "simply reweighing the 'reliability factors' under Roberts and
finding that Sylvia Crawford's statement falls short,"s7 the U.S. Supreme Court
used the opportunity to examine the basic principles of the Confrontation
Clause."
The Court began by reviewing the history of confrontation rights and
abuses in England59 and early American case law.6 o The Court noted that early
concurring). Any doubt was surely put to rest in Whorton v. Bockting, where the Court
explicitly stated three times that Crawford overruled Roberts. 549 U.S. 406, 413, 416, 419
(2007).
49. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38-41.
so. Id. at 38-39-
s. Id. at 39-40.
52. Id. at 40.
53. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3 d 656, 658 (Wash. 2002), rev'd and remanded, 541 U.S. 36.
54. Id.; see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
55. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41.
s6. Id. at 41-42.
57. Id. at 67.
58. See id. at 50-56 (discussing the principles that emerge from the test and history of the
Confrontation Clause, the concerns of the Framers, and the case law at the time of the
Founding).
s9. Id. at 43-47.
6o. Id. at 47-50.
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American courts and common law courts in England had adopted fairly robust
confrontation rights that ensured testimony against criminal defendants would
be presented through live witnesses." Early state constitutions formalized
these guarantees even before the U.S. Constitution was adopted."
The Founders, according to Crawford, were motivated to protect
confrontation rights because of prominent abuses of those rights in England,
most famously the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.6' Raleigh was convicted of
treason.* The primary evidence against him was incriminating testimony
given ex parte by Cobham, an alleged co-conspirator against the Crown, and
then read in court.6 Cobharn's confession had been obtained after an
examination by the Privy Council, raising the obvious concern that Cobham
had implicated Raleigh under coercion and to save his own life.6 6 Raleigh
argued that questioning Cobham in person was the only way to expose the lie.
But the court denied his demands to confront and question Cobham.
Academic commentators have frequently cited Raleigh's trial and similar
abuses as motivation for the Confrontation Clause. 8 On this view, the
Confrontation Clause was not an evidentiary rule for securing only reliable
evidence but a crucial check against state abuses of power.6 9 Following this
reasoning, Crawford concluded that the Confrontation Clause was primarily
aimed at preventing the "evil . .. of ex parte examinations [used] as evidence
61. Id. at 45-50.
62. Id. at 48.
63. See id. at 50 ("It was these practices that the Crown deployed in notorious treason cases like
Raleigh's ... and that the founding-era rhetoric decried."); infra notes 256-259.
64. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.; see also FIsHER, supra note 39, at 360-62 (quoting various transcripts of Raleigh's trial).
68. See Erwin N. Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 711,
712 (1971) (noting that the Confrontation Clause "is said to find its historical origin in the
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh"); Todd H. Neuman, Note, A Child's Well Being v. A Defendant's
Right to Confrontation, 93 W. VA. L. REV. io61, 1072 (1991) ("[M]any legal historians cite the
1603 treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh as the catalytic influence in the development of the
right to confront one's accusers."). But see Kenneth W. Graham Jr., The Right of
Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BuLL.
99, loo n-4 (1972) ("My research gives me no reason to suppose that [the link between
Raleigh's trial and the Sixth Amendment] represents anything other than a convenient but
highly romantic myth, and I adhere to it for this reason.").
69. See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for
a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REv. 557 (1992).
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against the accused."o7
Thus, the Court concluded, the Confrontation Clause was neither aimed
exclusively at in-court testimony nor applicable to all out-of-court statements.7'
Rather, the Confrontation Clause "reflects an especially acute concern with a
specific type of out-of-court statement." 2 Those "specific . . . statement[s]"
follow from the text of the Confrontation Clause itself."
The text of the Confrontation Clause refers to "witnesses against" the
accused.' The Court, searching for a historically grounded interpretation,
adopted a nineteenth-century definition of a "witness" as someone who
"bear[s] testimony."7 ' Therefore, to decide if any statement can be introduced
against the accused at trial without violating the Confrontation Clause, one
must know if the declarant was acting as a "witness" by "bearing testimony."76
Only some out-of-court statements bear testimony. Statements that bear
testimony are the only statements that violate the Confrontation Clause if they
are offered against the accused at trial without confrontation. Crawford offered
three possible definitions "of this core class of 'testimonial statements"' but
declined either to choose between them or to provide a single comprehensive
definition.
Definition One: "[E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent -that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations,
prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine or
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to
be used prosecutorially .... ."71
70. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
71. Id. at 50-53.
72. Id. at 51.
73. Id.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7s. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 51-52. As I use the term, a "definition" is a dispositive test. By applying the definition
to any particular statement, one can determine whether the statement is or is not
testimonial. By contrast, I refer to other important considerations as "factors." Factors play
an important but not outcome-determinative role in establishing whether a statement is
testimonial. For a similar dichotomy, see People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019, 1026 (N.Y.
2008), which distinguishes "formulations," which I refer to as "definitions," from the
"additional clues," which I refer to as "factors."
78. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (citation omitted).
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Definition Two: "[E]xtrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony,
or confessions . . . . "79
Definition Three: "[S]tatements that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial .... "8o
The Court then found that Sylvia Crawford's statements would count as
testimonial under any of the three definitions;" thus, the Court reversed
Michael Crawford's conviction.2
Courts have generally concluded that Definition Three (the "objective
witness" formulation) is the broadest of the Crawford definitions.8 ' There are
many statements that an objective observer would reasonably expect to be
available for use at trial that are nonetheless made informally, without an
affidavit, deposition, or interrogation. There are, however, a few cases in which
statements are testimonial under Definition Two ("formalized" statements)
but not under Definition Three ("objective witness"). Table i illustrates how
courts might reach different conclusions about a statement's testimonial nature
by adopting different definitions.
79. Id. at 51-52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
This definition was first proposed by Justice Thomas's concurrence in White. The Court
seems implicitly to have rejected a literal reading of this definition in later cases. See
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329-30 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(describing how the majority approach inappropriately broadens the reach of the
Confrontation Clause by not confining its scope to formal statements); Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 n.5 (2oo6) (rejecting a formality-based definition of
testimonial as easily circumvented).
8o. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
81. Id. at 61.
82. Id. at 69.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484, 500 n.ui (6th Cit. 2005) (referring to the
Supreme Court's third definition of testimonial as the "broadest"); State v. Mizenko, 127
P-3d 458, 466 (Mont. 20o6) (describing the objective witness definition as "the broadest of
the extant formulations acknowledged by Crawford").
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Table i.
CONFLICTS BETWEEN CRAWFORD DEFINITIONS TWO AND THREE
TESTIMONIAL UNDER THE NONTESTIMONIAL UNDER THE
"OBJECTIVE WITNESS" TEST "OBJECTIVE WITNESS" TEST
TESTIMONIAL UNDER THE - Police interrogations Videotaped statements by
"FORMALITY" TEST - Prior grand jury testimony8s child witnesses86
NONTESTIMONIAL UNDER THE - Suicide notes8 7 Statements to friends prior to
"FORMALITY" TEST - Autopsy reports88  the crime89
The Crawford Court probably did not set out to create intentionally vague
and potentially contradictory standards for evaluating Confrontation Clause
challenges. One might therefore view Crawford as an example of
incrementalism; the Court wanted to feel its way through a new doctrinal
84. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52-53, 68.
85. Id. at 68.
86. Many interviews with child witnesses are formal and akin to the civil ex parte examination
and are thus testimonial under Definition Two; these interviews are nontestimonial under
Definition Three if and only if the objective witness used for comparison is an objective
witness possessing the age and mental capacity of a child witness. Compare People v. Vigil,
127 P. 3d 916, 925 (Colo. 20o6) (en banc) ("If the Crawford Court had intended the objective
witness test to be applied from the perspective of an objectively reasonable observer
educated in the law, the Crawford Court would have labeled the co-conspirator's statement
'testimonial.' However, by labeling the statement non-testimonial, Crawford directs us to
apply the objective witness test from the perspective of an objectively reasonable person in
the declarant's position." (footnotes omitted)), with State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 328-29
(Md. 2005) ("[W]e are unwilling to conclude that, as a matter of law, young children's
statements cannot possess the same testimonial nature as those of other, more clearly
competent declarants.").
8. See Miller v. Stovall, 6o8 F.3d 913, 923-26 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a suicide note by a
former police officer is testimonial under the third Crawford formulation, but declining to
endorse a lower-court holding that the note was testimonial under the second Crawford
formulation).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3 d 227, 233-36 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that although
"Crawford at least suggests that the determinative factor in determining whether a declarant
bears testimony is the declarant's awareness or expectation that his or her statements may
later be used at a trial," autopsy reports do not qualify as testimonial because "this statement
. . . should [not] be read to have adopted such an expansive definition of testimonial"
(quoting United States v. Saget, 377 F.3 d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004)))-
89. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51; State v. Mizenko, 127 P.3 d 458, 467-68 (Mont. 20o6) (citing
numerous state court cases to support the proposition that statements made to a "friend,
family member or acquaintance" are nontestimonial "unless the declarant had clear reason
to believe that they will be used prosecutorially").
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framework while avoiding the need to subsequently retreat from an overly
specific first decision.9 o Section III.B of this Note advances a different
conclusion: Crawford in fact had a clear message, but not necessarily a clear
doctrine. The telos of the decision-constraining state investigatory power-
may not be clear to scholars, but it has been incorporated into the results of
lower-court decisions. Whatever the Court's motivation, Crawford was roundly
criticized for establishing ambiguous tests that created great uncertainty among
lower courts."
C. Davis's Refinement of Crawford
Two years after Crawford, the Court used Davis v. Washington and its
companion case, Hammon v. Indiana, to try to clarify the definition of
"testimonial" statements.92 Both Davis and Hammon involved domestic
violence prosecutions. In Davis, the state prosecuted Adrian Davis for felony
violation of a domestic no-contact order.93 At trial, Davis's alleged victim,
Michelle McCottry, did not testify.9 4 Instead, the prosecution introduced a
recording of a 911 call in which McCottry accused Davis of physically abusing
her.95 Davis was convicted and appealed, arguing that since McCottry had not
testified, introducing the 911 call violated his confrontation rights." Both the
Washington Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court upheld
Davis's conviction, holding that the 911 call was nontestimonial.
In Hammon v. Indiana, the police responded to a domestic disturbance call
go. The Crawford majority acknowledged that its "refusal to articulate a comprehensive
definition in this case will cause interim uncertainty." 541 U.S. at 68 n.10.
91. See, e.g., Triplett v. Hudson, No. 3 :o9-CV-01281, 2011 WL 976575, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Mar.
17, 2011) ("[T]he extent to which Crawford applied to forensic laboratory reports created
great confusion among lower federal and state courts and remained an unresolved issue
until Melendez-Diaz."); State v. Mason, 126 P.3d 34, 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) ("Crawford
addresses statements made to government officials during examinations or interrogations
initiated by those officials. As soon as the focus moves to disputed out-of-court statements
voluntarily made by the witness during witness-initiated contact, confusion arises." (footnote
omitted)); see also sources cited supra notes 11-18 (critiquing the Crawford line as vague,
unclear, and inconsistent in its application).
92. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) ("[T]hese cases require us to determine
more precisely which police interrogations produce testimony.").
93. Id. at 818.
94. Id. at 818-19.
95. Id.
g6. Id. at 819.
97. Id.
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and found a frightened Amy Hammon. 8 After observing physical damage to
the property, the police officers separated Amy from her husband, Hershel, and
asked her what had happened.99 Amy stated that Hershel had beaten her, and
signed a battery affidavit attesting to that fact.' At trial, the prosecution
introduced the affidavit and Amy's statements, but Amy did not testify.'
Hershel was convicted, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction, holding that Amy's statement was an excited utterance and
nontestimonial.o 2
Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Washington trial court
had properly admitted McCottry's 911 phone call,0 3 but that the Indiana trial
court had improperly admitted Hammon's statements and affidavit.' 4 Davis is
noteworthy because it introduced a fourth definition of "testimonial" out-of-
court statements.
Definition Four: "Statements are nontestimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation
is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.""os
Just how consistent are Crawford and Davis? Certainly there are areas of
convergence. Davis continued to accept Crawford's description of the "core"
forms of testimonial statements,1, 6 although it did refine some of the relevant
terms.'0 7 Both cases express a concern with the degree to which a disputed
98. Id.
99. Id, at 819-20.
100. Id. at 820.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 821.
103. Id. at 820-22, 828.
104. Id. at 834.
105. Id. at 822.
106. Id. at 823.
107. See id. at 823-26 ("Moreover, as we have just described, the facts of [Crawford] spared us the
need to define what we meant by 'interrogations.' The Davis case today does not permit us
this luxury of indecision. . . . When we said in Crawford, that 'interrogations by law
enforcement officers fall squarely within [the] class' of testimonial hearsay, we had
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statement resembles an ex parte examination.io8 Although Davis omitted
Crawford's lengthy historical discussion, it cited a string of Supreme Court
precedent stretching back into the nineteenth century suggesting a historical
and originalist foundation for its concern with testimonial statements." 9
Furthermore, the Court explicitly contrasted McCottry's statements with the
statements used against Sir Walter Raleigh at his infamous trial, finding that
her statements were meant to "seek help" rather than "substitute for live
testimony" in the manner of Cobham's statements against Raleigh.' Finally,
one can argue that Davis's definition of testimonial statements, even if distinct
from Crawford's definitions, applies narrowly to the context of police
interrogation, whereas Crawford remains applicable generally."' Some courts
have adopted a hybrid test that combines Crawford and Davis by applying Davis
to police interrogations and Crawford in other contexts.m1
There are, however, great theoretical inconsistencies between Crawford and
Davis. The most glaring inconsistency is the shift in focus between Crawford's
"objective witness" definition and Davis's "primary purpose" definition.
Definition Three in Crawford turned on the perception of an objective witness
hearing the statement."' Definition Four in Davis, by contrast, turned on the
perception of the interrogating party eliciting a statement."4 Professor Lininger
has compellingly explained the problems posed by this discrepancy:
This shift is theoretically inconsistent, and it is also problematic as a
practical matter. For example, if an officer questions a clear-headed
declarant while an emergency is pending and the declarant
immediately in mind (for that was the case before us) interrogations solely directed at
establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the
perpetrator." (citation omitted) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004))).
ios. See id. at 828.
iog. See id. at 824-25.
11o. Id. at 828 (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)).
iii. Myrna S. Raeder, Confrontation Clause Analysis After Davis, 22 CluM. JUST., Spring 2007, at
10, 12 ("I do not believe that Davis has totally displaced Crawford because Davis limited itself
to police interrogation while Crawford's dicta reached statements made in judicial contexts,
and both cases left unresolved whether statements to private individuals can be testimonial,
and if so by what criteria.").
112. See, e.g., State v. Gilfillan, No. o8AP-317, 2009 WL 638264, at *16 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 11,
2009) ("The 'primary purpose' test applies to determining whether statements in police
interrogations are testimonial. The 'objective witness' test applies to determining whether
statements in non-police interrogations are testimonial.").
113. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004).
114. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
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contemplates the prosecutorial use of her statement, the statement may
nonetheless fall outside the definition of "testimonial" under Davis. On
the other hand, if a declarant subjectively believes that she is still in
grave danger but the facts do not support this conclusion as an
objective matter, a court might classify her statement as testimonial
under Davis even though she lacks the state of mind that Crawford
would have required."'
Several smaller discrepancies exist between Crawford and Davis. First, Davis
appears to have repudiated Crawford's emphasis on formality. Although the
formality of a statement is still significant in determining whether the
statement is testimonial, Davis stated that formality is not outcome
determinative in Confrontation Clause cases."' Second, Davis collapsed the
distinction between core and periphery under the scope of the Confrontation
Clause."' Table 2 illustrates the tension between Crawford's Definition Three
and Davis's "primary purpose" definition.
115. Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271, 280 (2006)
[hereinafter Lininger, Reconceptualizing]; see also Tom Lininger, Davis and Hammon: A Step
Forward, or a Step Back? 105 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 30 (20o6) [hereinafter
Lininger, Forward] ("The focus in Davis on police motives is theoretically inconsistent with
Crawford . . . "); Ross, supra note 25, at 404-05 ("Davis v. Washington must be understood as
a retreat from the principles laid out in Crawford. . . . It makes little sense that a person's
opportunity to cross-examine a witness rests not on whether the out-of-court statement
serves to accuse the defendant at trial, but on the police officer's reason for gathering the
statement in the first place.").
16. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 826.
117. See Ross, supra note 25, at 411 ("By using the word 'core' to identify a perimeter, the Davis
Court collapsed the broad possibilities of the term core in Crawford . . . . [T] he core became
the circumference or perimeter of the scope of the clause."). Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
557 U.S. 305 (2009), collapses this distinction more explicitly. Whereas Crawford described
its three definitions as formulations of the "core" class of testimonial statements covered by
the Confrontation Clause, Melendez-Diaz refered to those same three definitions as simply
"the class of testimonial statements covered by the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 309. Since
the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay, the class of testimonial
statements covered by the Confrontation Clause equals the entire class of statements
covered by the Confrontation Clause.
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Table 2.
CONFLICTS BETWEEN CRAWFORD DEFINITION THREE AND DAVIS DEFINITION
TESTIMONIAL UNDER THE NONTESTIMONIAL UNDER THE
PRIMARY PURPOSE" TEST "PRIMARY PURPOSE" TEST
TESTIMONIAL UNDER THE - Police interrogationss Spouse's affidavit for a
"OBJECTIVE WITNESS" - Prior grand jury testimony" preliminary protective order 2 0
TEST - Private business certifications
of authenticiry
- Veterinary technician and
.. 122veterinarian report
NONTESTIMONIAL UNDER Statements to undercover Statements to friends prior to
THE "OBJECTIVE informants 2 3  the crime"'s
WITNESS" TEST
Responses to Davis were decidedly mixed. Indeed, Davis has earned the
distinction among criminal procedure cases of taking heavy criticism from both
118. See supra note 84.
11g. See supra note 85.
120. See Crawford v. Commonwealth, 686 S.E.2d 557, 567-69 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that
"[a]lthough the Supreme Court of the United States recently stated that affidavits fall
within the 'core class of testimonial statements' subject to the Confrontation Clause," an
affidavit used "to obtain a civil, preliminary protective order" was not testimonial because it
was made in anticipation of a civil action, and not a criminal trial (citations omitted)). This
case seems anomalous and may well have been decided differently in the wake of Bullcoming
v. Newv Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Yeley-Davis, 632 F. 3d 673, 68o-8i (ioth Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
2172 (2011) (holding that certificates of authenticity and accompanying affidavits for cell
phone records are nontestimonial).
122. See, e.g., Holz v. State, No. o6-o 9 -ool72-CR, 2010 WL 1041068, at *1-2 (Tex. App. Mar. 23,
2010) (holding that veterinary reports were nontestimonial under the Davis primary
purpose test even though the authors of the reports "could have reasonably believed that
[their veterinary reports] would be available at a later trial").
123. Cf Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 553, 562 (2007)
("When we speak of the anticipation of a reasonable person in the declarant's position, we
are referring to a hypothetical person who has all the information about the particular
situation that the declarant does, and no more. Thus, if the declarant is speaking to an
undercover police officer, the hypothetical person would not know that her audience is
collecting information for use in prosecution.").
124. See supra note 89.
801
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys. 2 s Prosecutors are concerned that
Davis complicates domestic violence prosecutions by narrowing the range of
admissible hearsay statements from victims.12' Those sympathetic to
defendants, by contrast, argue that Davis weakened and misconstrued the
central holding of Crawford by carving out malleable exceptions to
confrontation rights. 1 2 An additional concern is that in an attempt to clarify
the doctrine, Davis had the unintended side effect of providing police with a
roadmap for circumventing confrontation rights.128 In Section III.B, I argue
that Davis and Crawford can in fact be recognized as sharing a common
philosophical purpose. The differing definitions are not contradictory because
they are illustrative, not definitive.
D. Further Refinements: Melendez-Diaz, Bryant, and Williams
The Court has decided several Confrontation Clause cases since Davis.2 9
The three most important of these cases are Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,3 0
Michigan v. Bryant,"' and Williams v. Illinois.'3 2 Melendez-Diaz considered the
125. See Lininger, Reconceptualizing, supra note 115, at 274.
126. See, e.g., id. at 284-85 (arguing that Davis reduced the value of the excited utterance
exception, encouraged batterers to murder their victims, provided perverse incentives for
police to prolong ongoing emergencies, and incentivized police to lock up victims using
material witness warrants).
127. See Ross, supra note 25, at 404-05 ("Davis v. Washington must be understood as a retreat
from the principles laid out in Crawford. . . . [The "primary purpose" test in Davis] means
that even if one person accuses another person of a crime, that initial accusation may serve
as the basis to bring charges, hold the defendant before trial, and convict the defendant, if
the police were engaged in resolving an emergency at the time the accusation was made.").
128. See Lininger, Forward, supra note 115, at 29 ("[P]olice will likely try to adapt their practices
so that they can accomplish the same goals by simply incanting the right rationale for their
actions. For example, police will probably be much more careful in their reports to list
circumstances supporting an inference of 'ongoing emergency' at the time the police
question hearsay declarants."). Professor Lininger concludes that this concern is overblown
because the circumstances objectively must indicate an ongoing emergency. Id. at 29. Given
the Court's expansive interpretation of ongoing emergencies in Bryant, see infra notes
164-166 and accompanying text, Professor Lininger's optimism might have been premature.
129. 1 will not discuss Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (20o8), or Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.
Ct. 2705 (2011). The former considers the relationship between the Confrontation Clause
and the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" doctrine, while the latter addresses the particular
witness whom a defendant has a right to confront under Melendez-Diaz. Though
interesting, these cases are not directly relevant to the central questions of this Note.
130. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
131. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
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specific application of Crawford to forensic analyses of criminal evidence.
Defendant Luis Melendez-Diaz was convicted of distributing and trafficking
cocaine." At trial, the Government introduced certificates of analysis showing
the results of a drug-sample test. The certificates indicated that evidence seized
by the police was in fact cocaine. 134 Melendez-Diaz objected that the evidence
was admitted without an opportunity for him to cross-examine the analysts
who signed the certificate."'s The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed the
conviction, and the Supreme Judicial Court denied review."'
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Melendez-Diaz's Sixth
Amendment rights had been violated."' Specifically, the Court reasoned that
the "certificates of analysis" presented by the government were affidavits,"'
and "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case
via ex parte out-of-court affidavits."" 9 Although the Court felt Melendez-Diaz
"involve[d] little more than the application of . .. Crawford,"4o the decision
was novel in several respects. First, the testimony in Melendez-Diaz, which
concerned analysis of evidence performed long after any crime was completed,
was categorically different from the testimony in prior Confrontation Clause
cases, which concerned direct observation of allegedly criminal acts. The
witnesses in Crawford, Davis, and Hammon, in other words, were all
conventional criminal-case witnesses of the type the Framers would have
recognized. 141 Second, Melendez-Diaz contradicted a substantial number of
132. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
133. 557 U.S. at 308-09.
134. Id. at 308.
135. Id. at 309.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 329.
138. Id. at 310 ("The documents at issue here, while denominated by Massachusetts law
'certificates,' are quite plainly affidavits . . .
139. Id. at 329.
140. Id.
141. The dissent in Melendez-Diaz emphasized this point. Id. at 343-44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("Laboratory analysts are not 'witnesses against' the defendant as those words would have
been understood at the framing. . . . [T]he [Confrontation] Clause refers to a conventional
'witness'- meaning one who witnesses . . . an event that gives him or her personal
knowledge of some aspect of the defendant's guilt."). The majority argued that there is no
constitutional basis for distinguishing between conventional and nonconventional
witnesses. Id. at 315-16 (majority opinion). Even if the majority is ultimately correct that the
Confrontation Clause ought to apply to laboratory analysts, I cannot agree that this
conclusion is especially obvious. Cravford's reasoning is conspicuously originalist. See Laird
C. Kirkpatrick, Nontestimonial Hearsay After Crawford, Davis and Bockting, 19 REGENT U. L.
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lower-court decisions 42 and surprised commentators, who did not expect the
Court to apply such a robust confrontation right against forensic analyses.
Melendez-Diaz demonstrated that Davis's "primary purpose" test did not
displace the three Crawford tests except, possibly, in the context of police
interrogations.143  The Court relied explicitly on the "objective witness"
formulation to explain why the certificates of analysis were testimonial."
Rather than offering any wholly new test for Confrontation Clause violations,
the Court presented, in dicta, a number of novel factors for applying the Davis
and Crawford definitions.
First, Melendez-Diaz clarified that Crawford meant what it said-affidavits
are, almost absolutely, considered testimonial.' Second, Davis does not define
the outer boundaries of testimonial statements, because a statement may be
testimonial even though it was not made during a police interrogation.146
Third, certain types of hearsay such as medical records' 7 and business or
public records are nontestimonial.148
Michigan v. Bryant considered the scope of Davis's "primary purpose" and
"ongoing emergency" tests for applying the Confrontation Clause to police
interrogations. Defendant Richard Bryant was convicted of murdering
Anthony Covington.'4 9 At Bryant's trial, the government introduced the
REV. 367, 382 (2007) (characterizing the Crawford opinion as a "model of originalist
interpretation"). Thus, it makes good sense to carefully consider how the Framers would
have regarded the hearsay testimony of forensic analysts.
142. See Triplett v. Hudson, No. 3:09-CV-01281, 2011 WL 976575, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 17,
2011) ("Indeed, the courts who addressed this question generally found that the Crawford
rule did not apply to these laboratory reports . . . . Many other courts addressing the issue
also held that Crawford was not violated by the admission of laboratory reports where the
technician who prepared the report was not available for cross examination.");
Commonwealth v. Williams, 69 Va. Cit. 277, 280 (2005) ("This Court follows the majority
of state courts and the direction of the Court of Appeals of Virginia and finds that the
certificate of analysis is not testimonial."). But see Garcia v. Roden, 672 F. Supp. 2d 198, 2o8
(D. Mass. 2009) (noting that Melendez-Diaz was "clearly foreshadowed" by Crawford).
143. See 557 U.S. at 310 (quoting in full the three Crawford definitions).
144. Id. at 310-11.
145. See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
146. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 316.
147. Id. at 312 n.2 ("[M]edical reports created for treatment purposes . . . would not be
testimonial under our decision today.").
148. Id. at 324 ("Business and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation not
because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because-having been
created for the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact at trial -they are not testimonial.").
149. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011).
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testimony of police officers who had questioned Covington on the night of the
shooting."so The officers testified that when they asked Covington what had
happened, he responded that "Rick" had shot him."' Bryant appealed his
conviction, arguing that the admission of Covington's statements through the
officers violated his right to confront Covington.'" The Michigan Court of
Appeals affirmed his conviction; the Supreme Court of Michigan then
remanded in light of Davis."s' The Court of Appeals once again affirmed
Bryant's conviction, but the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed, holding that
Covington's statements were testimonial because the primary purpose of the
officers who questioned Covington was to investigate the crime, rather than to
respond to an ongoing emergency.154
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements were
nontestimonial because the primary purpose of the police was to respond to an
ongoing emergency."s The Bryant Court did not rely on any imminent danger
to the victim, Anthony Covington. Rather, Bryant emphasized the ongoing
danger to the officers and the general public.156 Bryant therefore expanded the
scope of the ongoing-emergency reasoning first applied in Davis.'
As with Melendez-Diaz, Bryant did not offer any new definitions of
testimonial statements. Because the victim's statements were made during
questioning by the police, the Bryant Court applied the Davis "primary
purpose" test. 58 At the same time, the Court reiterated the original Crawford
caveat that it did not intend to exhaustively classify all statements, or even all
statements in response to police interrogation, as testimonial or
nontestimonial.159
Although Bryant offered a fairly faithful recitation of the Crawford-Davis
doctrine, its application impressed many commentators as novel. For the first
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1150-51.
153. Id. Covington's statements were not introduced as dying declarations because the
prosecution failed to establish the required factual predicates. Id. at 1151 n.1.
154. Id. at 1151.
155. Id. at 1166-67.
156. Id. at 1163-66 (explaining that an ongoing emergency existed because the officers knew a
potential shooter with a gun was wandering the area and neither the police nor Covington
knew the shooter's location).
157. See Langley v. State, 28 A-3d 646, 652 n.3 (Md. 2011) ("[A]fter Bryant, the 'ongoing
emergency' concept is no longer construed so narrowly.").
158. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1154.
159. Id. at 1155.
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time in a Crawford-line case, Justice Scalia dissented. He began by attacking
one of the key developments first implied in Davis but fully articulated in
Bryant: the Court's focus on the intent of the interrogating officer alongside the
intent of the declarant of the statement. 6 o The shift in focus from declarant to
both declarant and questioner might have seemed obvious in the wake of
Davis, 16 but Justice Scalia felt this focus sounded the death knell for the
Crawford revolution.162 Nor was Justice Scalia alone in this opinion. Observers
argued that Melendez-Diaz was a high-water mark for the Confrontation
Clause, with Bryant reversing the trend of robust protection of the
confrontation right.1'
Critics of Bryant expressed particular concern with the decision's broad
definition of an ongoing emergency. Under Bryant, response to an ongoing
emergency may extend beyond merely helping a victim in distress. It may
include a response to a broader threat to public safety.164 The threat to public
safety in turn depends on the injuries of the victim and the weapon used. 65
Critics fear that Bryant provided prosecutors with a game plan for admitting
almost any statement without confrontation, simply by arguing that the
officers eliciting the statement faced a potential threat to public safety.'6
16o. Id. at 1168-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[B]ecause the Court picks a perspective so will I: The
declarant's intent is what counts. . . . A declarant-focused inquiry is also the only inquiry
that would work in every fact pattern implicating the Confrontation Clause.").
161. See supra notes 11s, 125-127 and accompanying text.
162. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The only virtue of the Court's
approach ... is that it leaves judges free to reach the 'fairest' result under the totality of the
circumstances. . . . Unfortunately, under this malleable approach 'the guarantee of
confrontation is no guarantee at all."' (quoting Giles v. California, 541 U.S. 353, 375 (2008)
(plurality opinion)).
163. See Cicchin, supra note 7; Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Michigan v. Bryant: The
Counter-Revolution Begins 1 (UCLA Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 11-07, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.con/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1798877
("[T]he majority of the [Bryant] [Clourt, over a bitter dissent from Justice Scalia, effectively
over-ruled Crawford and pushed confrontation doctrine back in the direction of Roberts.").
164. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158 ("[The Michigan Supreme Court] employed an unduly narrow
understanding of 'ongoing emergency' . . . . An assessment of whether an emergency that
threatens the police and public is ongoing cannot narrowly focus on whether the threat
solely to the first victim has been neutralized because the threat to the first responders and
public may continue.").
165. Id. at 1158.
166. See Richard D. Friedman, Preliminary Thoughts on the Bryant Decision, CONFRONTATION
BLOG (Mar. 2, 2011, 12:42 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.conV20n1/o3
/preliminary-thoughts-on-bryant-decision.html ("So one of my concerns is that police
officers will quickly learn that they can get statements characterized as non-testimonial if
8o6
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Bryant also clarified certain dicta from earlier Confrontation Clause
decisions. First, Bryant noted that the most important out-of-court statements
for confrontation purposes are those that involve formal interrogations by state
actors.'6, Second, Bryant instructed courts to determine the primary purpose of
an interrogation objectively, accounting for all the surrounding circumstances
including the characteristics of the speaker and questioner."' Third, formality
continues to be an important but not decisive factor in determining whether a
statement is testimonial."' Many factors tend to show a statement is not
formal, including (1) questioning in a public area, (2) questioning prior to the
arrival of emergency services, and (3) disorganized questioning.170
In June 2012, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Illinois."' The State of
Illinois used a DNA comparison to prosecute Sandy Williams.' Rather than
introducing the comparison into evidence, Illinois offered the testimony of an
expert witness who gave an opinion based on a laboratory report."' Illinois
argued that the testimony of its expert witness offered only an opinion about
the report and did not introduce the contents of the DNA comparison as a
testimonial statement.174
Williams did not produce a majority holding. Four Justices, in an opinion
written by Justice Alito, stated that the expert's testimony did not violate the
Confrontation Clause because the expert's statements were not offered to prove
the truth of the laboratory report's contents, and thus the Confrontation
Clause was not implicated. 17s Moreover, Justice Alito reasoned that the
they testify, in effect, 'I came up to the scene and didn't know what was happening. My
principal concern was securing the public safety."').
167. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 ("[T]he most important instances in which the Clause restricts the
introduction of out-of-court statements are those in which state actors are involved in a
formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for trial.").
16g. Id. at 1160-62 ("In addition to the circumstances in which an encounter occurs, the
statements and actions of both the declarant and interrogators provide objective evidence of
the primary purpose of the interrogation. . . . Taking into account a victim's injuries does
not transform this objective inquiry into a subjective one. The inquiry is still objective
because it focuses on the understanding and purpose of a reasonable victim in the
circumstances of the actual victim- circumstances that prominently include the victim's
physical state."),
16g. Id. at 116o.
170. Id.
171. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
172. Id. at 2227.
173. Id. at 2229-30.
174. Id. at 2231.
175. Id. at 2238-41.
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contents of the DNA comparison were themselves nontestimonial.176 justice
Alito's plurality opinion defined testimonial statements as "having the primary
purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct" and
"involv[ing] formalized statements. Because the DNA comparison in
Williams was prepared before any suspect had been identified, Justice Alito
reasoned that its contents could not have been prepared for the purpose of
targeting a specific individual engaged in criminal conduct.17
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment but explicitly rejected the
majority's reasoning, as did the dissent. 179 Justice Thomas reiterated his view
that testimonial statements must be formalized,so and therefore concluded
that the informal report at issue in Williams was nontestimonial.S
Williams did little to clarify the law, and there is little reason to believe it
will have a lasting impact." There are few reported opinions that cite
Williams. Because Justice Alito's opinion did not secure the votes of a majority
of the Court, his reasoning does not constitute binding precedent. " Moreover,
the case itself has several unusual facts, such as the lack of a formal affidavit
accompanying the laboratory report. These factual nuances may provide a
further basis for lower courts to distinguish Williams when they disagree with
its reasoning, because the specific factual circumstances of Williams will rarely
be replicated.'"4
The Crawford line offers four overarching definitions of testimonial
statements and many factors that courts should consider in applying those
definitions. Although Bryant suggests that the "primary purpose" test has
emerged as the Court's preferred definition, the Court has never explicitly
abandoned the definitions of testimonial statements in Crawford or Melendez-
Diaz. And the importance of formality-one of the Crawford tests-may be
renewed in the wake of Williams.
176. Id. at 2242-44.
177. Id. at 2242.
178. Id. at 2243-44.
179. Id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
iso. Id. at 2259-60.
181. Id. at 2260.
182. See Richard D. Friedman, Thoughts on Williams, Part I: Reasons To Think the Impact May Be
Limited, CONFRONTATION BLOG (June 19, 2012, 7:52 AM), http://confrontationright
.blogspot.con/2ol2/06/thoughts-on-williams-part-i-reasons-to.htm.
1s3. See id.
184. See id. ("The case appears to stand for nothing more tha[n] the proposition that in the
circumstances of this case there is no Confrontation Clause violation.").
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Lower courts can thus evaluate post-Crawford Confrontation Clause cases
in many ways, some of which are in tension with one another. Courts can
generally narrow the scope of confrontation rights by requiring formality,
especially in the wake of Williams, in which Justice Thomas's concurrence is
arguably controlling.' Courts could alternatively emphasize the anticipated
prosecutorial use of a statement to provide broader rights." Judicial
disagreements over how Crawford applies to child witnesses, 911 calls
(initially), and forensic analyses arguably show that Confrontation Clause
doctrine remains ambiguous after Crawford."'
A key question remains. If Crawford's doctrine is incoherent and muddled,
presenting frustrating legal puzzles in a few specific cases, how has Crawford
been interpreted by lower courts? More precisely, have lower-court decisions
applying Crawford been as inconsistent and ambiguous as Crawford itself?
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In order to assess the potential ambiguity of the Crawford line, I randomly
sampled and coded lower-court decisions'" and quantitatively analyzed the
facts and outcomes of those decisions. This Part details the empirical
methodology I employed and the results that this investigation produced.
Previous work has evaluated Crawford in the lower courts by closely
analyzing select decisions."9 While this is the standard method of legal
reasoning, there are important reasons to prefer systematic empirical analysis
of judicial opinions when surveying an area of law. First, empirical methods
help to counteract the cherry-picking phenomenon of conventional case
185. Cf Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n1.15 (1976) ("[T]he holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds . . . ."). Justice Thomas's opinion, which decided that the statements in
Williams were nontestimonial because they were not formalized, is arguably controlling
because it is narrower than the majority's version of the primary purpose test. See Jeffrey
Fisher, The Holdings and Implications of Williams v. Illinois, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2012,
2:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=147095.
i86. See supra Section I.B (explaining the relative breadth of the "objective witness"
formulation).
187. See supra notes 20-22.
i88. Specifically, I keycited all state court, federal district court, and federal appellate court
opinions citing Davis v. Washington through October 17, 2011. This yielded a population of
2,095 cases. I then randomly generated three hundred numbers between 1 and 2,095,
arranged the cases in chronological order, and read the cases with those three hundred
numbers.
i8g. See, e.g., Cicchini, supra note 7; Cicchini, supra note 12; Ross, supra note 25.
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analysis. This problem arises when scholars develop theories from a "small
series of cases."' 9o While those theories can be thought provoking, they rarely
provide a "robust explanation of how the law works.""9 ' A handful of
deliberately chosen cases cannot be considered a representative sample of the
law. Conclusions are at best tentative or uncertain when drawn from an
insufficiently large sample.' 92 By randomly sampling cases, or by analyzing the
entire pool of available cases on a subject, researchers can negate the biases of
traditional case-analysis methods.'93
Second, rigorous empirical methods help to discipline the researcher in
reading selected cases. Proper quantitative analysis requires the researcher to
develop a coding scheme before she reads the opinions. 9 4 A researcher
develops a set of variables and criteria for valuing each variable for a given
case.9 s When coding the cases, the researcher is forced to consider each
variable as it applies to each case. Thus, the researcher is less likely to suffer
from tunnel vision-picking and choosing the factors that subjectively stand
out in a given opinion.'
igo. Kay L. Levine, The Law Is Not the Case: Incorporating Empirical Methods into the Culture of
Case Analysis, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 300 (2006).
191. Id.
192. Cf Russell V. Lenth, Some Practical Guidelines for Effective Sample Size Determination, 55 Am.
STATISTICIAN 187, 187 (2001) ("[T]he study must be of adequate size, relative to the goals of
the study. It must be 'big enough' that an effect of such magnitude as to be of scientific
significance will also be statistically significant.").
193. See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96
CALIF. L. REv. 63, 79-80 (20o8) ("At the most basic level, empirically minded legal scholars
can be more systematic in selecting cases for analysis . . . by specifying a reproducible
selection of cases . . . such as reading every tenth case . . . or every federal appellate products
liability case over three years. . .. Disciplined research . . . guards against subliminal biases
in selecting only cases that prove the author's point.").
194. This is a specific manifestation of the scientific requirement of a prior research design. See
KlMBERLY A. NEUENDORF, THE CONTENT ANALYSIS GUIDEBOOK 11 (2002) ("Too often, a
so-called content analysis report describes a study in which variables were chosen and
'measured' after the messages were observed. This wholly inductive approach violates the
guidelines of scientific endeavor. All decisions on variables, their measurement, and coding
rules must be made before the observations begin.").
195. See Hall & Wright, supra note 193, at 107-09 (explaining the coding process).
196. Id. at 80-81 (explaining how systematic empirical analysis disciplines the reader and hedges
against confirmation bias in reading) (citing Charles M. Haar et al., Computer Power and
Legal Reasoning: A Case Study offudicial Decision Prediction in Zoning Amendment Cases, 2 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 651, 746 (1977)).
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A. The Data Set
I compiled a random sample of cases from Westlaw, decided before
October 17, 2011, that cite Davis.'"7 These cases could be from any federal
district court, federal court of appeals, or state court. The sample includes both
reported and unreported decisions, as well as decisions that had been
overturned on appeal. Of the 300 cases I sampled, I excluded 77. Those 77 were
nonbinding magistrate judge recommendations and cases in which the court
did not evaluate a Confrontation Clause challenge under Crawford's testimonial
framework. The remaining 223 cases included several instances in which a
single court evaluated multiple statements under the Crawford framework.
Thus, the final sample consisted of 278 statements from 223 cases.
For each statement, I coded nineteen independent variables and one
dependent variable-whether the reviewing court found the statement to be
testimonial or not. The coding rules are described in detail in Appendix A.
Table 3 lists the name of each variable and gives a description. I chose variables
that both captured the important factors cited in the Crawford line and could be
coded objectively.
811
197. I chose Davis rather than Crawford because Davis arguably began to stabilize the Court's
Confrontation Clause doctrine. Moreover, Davis introduced explicitly the importance of an
ongoing emergency-a fact that plays a significant role in recent Confrontation Clause cases.




VARIABLE DESCRIPTION STATEMENTS IN
THE SAMPLE
Testimonial Whether the statement was classified by the court as testimonial 90
Before Whether the statement was made before the charged offenses 42
During Whether the statement was made during the commission of the 26
charged offenses
Cop Whether the statement was made to a law enforcement officer 128
other than a 911 operator
Doc Whether the statement was made to a medical health 24
professional such as an EMT, doctor, or nurse
Gov Whether the statement was made to a government official other 14
than a law enforcement officer or 911 operator
Excited Whether the statement was classified as an excited utterance 85
Present Whether the statement was classified as a present sense impression 9
Dying Whether the statement was classified as a dying declaration 8
Record Whether the statement was classified as a business or 35
government record
Medical Whether the statement was made during medical treatment or 19
contained in medical records
Abuse Whether the statement was made during abuse counseling not 9
performed by a medical professional (as with a social worker)
Forensic Whether the statement was contained in a forensic or laboratory 23
analysis report
Call Whether the statement was made during a 911 call 38
Station Whether the statement was made in a government facility such 16
as a police station, courthouse, or city hall
Victim Whether the declarant of the statement was the victim of the 120
Speaking charged offenses
Injured Whether the statement was made with a significantly injured 74 (1o2 in
party nearby alternative
definition)
Taped Whether the statement was audio- or video-recorded 67
Habeas Whether the opinion was in a case on habeas review 36
The variable for measuring an injured party involved some subjective
judgment on my part about whether an injury was serious enough to warrant
medical attention. To address this, I included an alternate, more objective
definition of an injury. The results of the regression analysis are almost
identical between the two definitions, but the descriptive statistics do show
some differences between the definitions, which are discussed below.
812
122:782 2012
CONFRONTING CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON IN THE LOWER COURTS
B. Descriptive Statistics
This Section presents descriptive statistics -statistics that summarize and
explicate the data. Two conclusions were immediately obvious from the data.
First, the government won the majority of cases. Overall, courts held that only
90 of the 278 challenged statements were testimonial.,98 Even this figure - that
the defendants prevailed in only one-third of challenges -overestimates the
success of defendants. In many of those 90 cases, courts ultimately gave
judgment for the government on the basis of harmless error.' 99 Second, the
data showed a stark contrast in how courts evaluated statements made to
different categories of recipients. For all of the graphs and data reported below,
I did not include statements that were contained in forensic laboratory reports
because the doctrine surrounding forensic analyses has become more refined
than the general Crawford doctrine. This exclusion should have the effect of
exaggerating any ambiguity or uncertainty in Confrontation Clause cases.
Figure i plots the frequency with which statements to certain recipients were
held to be testimonial.
198. This figure refers to total statements. For the remaining descriptive statistics and regression
analysis, I excluded statements concerning forensic analyses. Out of 255 total statements not
concerning forensic analyses, 81 were testimonial, a difference of less than one percentage
point compared to the sample of all statements.
199. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 248 P.3d 362, 375 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that the trial
court's error in admitting testimonial statements against the defendant was harmless). The
flip side is that nearly all the cases evaluated were cases on appeal where the government had
prevailed below. So the one-third figure, while it overestimates defendant success on appeal,
may underestimate the overall success defendants have in mounting Confrontation Clause
challenges at any stage of a criminal case.
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Figure 1.












Police Officers Other Government Health 911 Operators Private Citizens
Officials Professionals
CATEGORY OF RECIPIENT
Each of the listed categories is defined by the coded variables. "Health Professionals"
includes EMTs, nurses, and doctors but not social workers. "Private citizens" is defined
residually, as recipients who are not police, other government officials, health
professionals, or 9nl operators. They may include friends or family members.
Figure i shows that statements are more likely to be held to be testimonial
when made to police officers or other government officials. They are less likely
to be held to be testimonial when made to health professionals or 911 operators
and very unlikely to be held to be testimonial when made to private citizens.
Whereas half of the challenged statements made to police officers and
nonpolice government officials were held to be testimonial, only around five
percent of statements to private citizens were held to be so. The most curious
feature of the data is the relatively high frequency, almost forty percent, with
which statements to health professionals were held to be testimonial. This
result is partly driven by statements to Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners (SANE
nurses) and other health practitioners who specialize in treating victims of
sexual assault and sexual abuse. These individuals are mandatory reporters
who are trained to collect evidence as well as provide medical treatment. As one
814
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court explained, SANE nurse questioning is the "functional equivalent of police
questioning."oo Statements made to SANE nurses thus draw great scrutiny
from reviewing courts.
Figure 2 combines the categories listed in Figure i to show the dramatic
difference in how courts treat statements to state actors and statements to
nonstate actors.
Figure 2.








State Actors Nonstate Actors
CATEGORY OF RECIPIENT
"State Actors" includes statements made to police or other government actors, not
including statements to 911 operators. "Nonstate Actors" includes any statement made
to a recipient other than a police officer, other government official, or 911 operator.
Without controlling for other factors, a statement is over three times more
likely to be held to be testimonial when it is made to a state actor. Section II.C
shows that the results are not quite so pronounced when one controls for other
variables. Nonetheless, considering that the Crawford line has not placed a
great deal of explicit emphasis on state action, these results are striking.
Less strikingly, the data also reflect different outcomes in cases where an
815
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injured party is involved in the events surrounding the statement. Figure 3
shows the outcomes in injured-party cases relative to non-injured-party cases.
Figure 3.
















Injured Party No Injured Party
Injury Specification A
Injured Party I No Injured Parry
Injury Specification B
PRESENCE OF AN INJURED PARTY
Specification A defined an injury as any shooting, stabbing, or other injury requiring
immediate medical assistance. This necessarily involved subjective judgment, as
explained above. Specification B coded the injury variable as i if a party was stabbed or
shot, and 0.5 if a party was otherwise physically harmed (for example, punched, kicked
or strangled). In this Figure, however, I included statements under "Injured Party" in
Specification B if the variable was coded either 1 or 0.5. To put the matter simply,
Specification B characterized more cases as having injured parties, and many of those
injuries were rather less serious.
Figure 3 shows that statements are, without controlling for other factors,
less likely to be held to be testimonial when an injured party is involved. The
results are most pronounced under Specification A, where an injury is defined
as a shooting, stabbing, or other injury requiring immediate medical assistance.
The presence of an injury should matter if courts are following the Crawford line.
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Davis stressed response to an ongoing emergency,2 o' presumably in many cases
a medical emergency. Bryant made this point explicit- emphasizing that
physical injury plays a significant role in evaluating the testimonial status of
statements.202
The reader might notice that the results in Figure 3 vary depending on how
an injury is defined. When one includes not only shootings, stabbings, and
other injuries requiring medical attention, but also kicks and punches, the
results are weaker. Figure 4 explores the result further, showing the results by
type of injury.
Figure 4.

















Severely Injured Party Slightly Injured Party No Injured Party
PRESENCE OF AN INJURED PARTY
"No Injured Party" refers to situations in which no party to the events was injured in
any way. "Slightly Injured Party" refers to situations in which the injury was coded as
0.5 under Specification B - in other words, where physical harm occurred but it was not
a shooting or stabbing. "Severely Injured Party" refers to situations where the injury
was coded as i under Specification B - a shooting or stabbing.
201. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (20o6).
202. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1161-62 (2011).
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Crawford provides some reason to view different injuries differently. If the
police see a victim with a black eye, they might respond more calmly and with
greater investigatory emphasis than if they had found a victim with a gunshot
wound. Statements made under those circumstances look more like substitutes
for live testimony produced through the kind of ex parte examinations that
troubled the Framers and the Crawford Court.
The results in Figure 4 suggest something different-when there is a slight
injury, statements are more likely to be held to be testimonial than when there
is no injury at all. This seemingly odd result is plausibly explained by the role
of state action. Statements made around a slight injury are more likely to be
made to state actors than statements made when there is no injury.o 3 The role
of state action may be overwhelming the effect of an injured party. To more
fully disentangle the relative effects of state action and injury requires
something more than description. To control for state action and injury-to
fully evaluate the interaction of all the variables at play-I employed logistic
regression.
C. Stepwise Logistic Regression Analysis
Regression analysis is a method for sorting and analyzing data.204 The
researcher assumes that a very general form of relationship exists between
variables and attempts to estimate the parameters in that relationship. For
example, a researcher might believe that an individual's salary depends on her
level of education, gender, and height. Regression analysis allows the
researcher to estimate, from a set of data about individuals' salaries, education
levels, genders, and heights, how a change in one independent variable will
affect salary.
Logistic regression is a particular type of regression. 0 Logistic regression
is useful when the researcher hopes to explain the relationship between several
203. Out of 60 statements made near a slightly injured party, 37 (or about 62%) were made to
state actors. Out of 176 statements made with no injured party nearby, 84 (or about 48%)
were made to state actors. This comparison excludes statements made to 911 operators.
204. See DAVID R. ANDERSON ET AL., STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 562 (11th ed.
2010) ("[R]egression analysis can be used to develop an equation showing how [two or
more] variables are related." (emphasis omitted)); Ewout W. Steyerberg et al., Stepwise
Selection in Small Data Sets: A Simulation Study of Bias in Logistic Regression Analysis, 52 J.
CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 935, 935 (1999) ("Multivariable regression analysis is a valuable
technique to quantify the relation between two or more covariables and an outcome
variable.").
205. For an explanation of how logistic regression differs from linear regression, see generally
FRED C. PAMPEL, LOGISTIC REGRESSION: A PRIMER ch. 1 (2000).
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explanatory variables and a binary dependent variable.2o6 A binary variable is
one that takes only two states. Whether someone has completed high school,
for example, is a binary variable. A person either completes or does not
complete high school. There is no third option. I employed logistic regression
because the dependent variable in my analysis -whether a statement is found
to be testimonial - takes only two values.
Stepwise regression adds a final nuance to regression analysis. Imagine a
scenario where a researcher is addressing a new problem without background
knowledge. For example, the researcher has collected a great deal of data about
death penalty defendants and wishes to know which of several hundred
characteristics affect the probability of an execution. The researcher may not
have enough data to run a useful regression analysis with all the variables.
Stepwise regression takes several iterative steps that narrow down the set of
variables to those explanatory variables which have a statistically significant
relationship with the dependent variable. There are several different methods
of stepwise regression. Some methods select variables into the final
specification. These methods, known as forward selection, add variables to the
specification in descending order of significance. The selection process ends
when all statistically significant variables have been added. Other methods
select variables out of the specification until all statistically insignificant
variables have been eliminated. Stepwise regression thus helps avoid sample
size problems by reducing the number of independent variables in the final
regression specification. With fewer variables, fewer observations are required
to have confidence in the resulting estimates.o' Stepwise regression has been
used frequently in empirical legal scholarship. Without using stepwise
regression, the sample size here would be relatively small. There would be
206. See NEUENDORF, supra note 194, at 169, 170-71 box 8.1.
207. The general rule for logistic regression analysis is that one wants ten or more events per
variable. See, e.g., Peter Peduzzi et al., A Simulation of the Number of Events per Variable in
Logistic Regression Analysis, 49 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 1373, 1373 (1996) (recommending
at least ten events per variable); Chao-Ying Joanne Peng et al., An Introduction to Logistic
Regression Analysis and Reporting, 96 J. EDUC. RES. 3, 10 (2002) (same). Events are defined as
the less likely dependent variable category. In my sample, eighty-one statements were held
to be testimonial -fewer than were held to be nontestimonial. With Io variables, I had 8.1
events per variable-less than ideal, but not fatal or even severely damaging to the results.
See Eric Vittinghoff & Charles E. McCulloch, Relaxing the Rule of Ten Events per Variable in
Logistic and Cox Regression, 165 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 710, 717 (2007) ("[S]ystematic
discounting of results, in particular statistically significant associations, from any model
with 5-9 EPV [events per variable] does not appear to be justified."). To the extent that low
sample size matters, it increases the variance of the estimated coefficients and makes a Type
II error more probable. Id. The danger of low sample size is usually a false negative and not
a false positive.
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fewer than five events per variable-i.e., fewer than five occurrences of a
statement being found testimonial for each independent variable. A sample
that small would dramatically reduce confidence in the results. Stepwise
regression eliminated statistically insignificant variables, resulting in more
events per variable-more occurrences of a testimonial statement for each
independent variable -in the final regression specification, thus allowing me to
more accurately estimate the true relationship between the variables.
Table 4 presents the results of the regression analysis. I did not include in
the regression analysis statements contained in forensic laboratory analyses for
the same reasons that I excluded those statements from the descriptive
statistics. The stepwise regression process eliminated several additional
variables that were not statistically significant.2os The middle column is the
most important.2 o9 It shows how a change in the associated variable changes
the probability that a statement will be found to be testimonial by the court,
holding other variables constant. For example, other factors equal, the fact that
a statement is made to a police officer makes it about 75% (between 6o% and
89%, with 95% confidence) more probable that the statement will be found to
be testimonial. Similarly, other factors equal, the fact that a statement is made
while one of the parties is injured decreases the probability that it will be found
to be testimonial by about 18% (between 8% and 28%, with 95% confidence).
2o8. The nonsignificant variables are those for the following: statement made before the crime,
opinion in a habeas petition, statement was a present sense impression, statement was a
dying declaration, statement was made by the crime victim, and statement was made in a
government building. I excluded all forensic analyses from the sample, so this variable could
not be significant.
209. The right-hand column shows how a change in each independent variable changes the
natural logarithm of the event that a statement is held to be testimonial (the dependent
variable). This effect is constant, regardless of the values of other independent variables,
whereas the percentage values in the middle column have a clearer practical meaning but can
vary depending on the values of different independent variables.
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Table 4.
REGRESSION RESULTS
VARIABLE CHANGE IN PROBABILITY LOGGED ODDS
THAT A STATEMENT IS COEFFICIENT
FOUND TESTIMONIAL
Recipient is a nonpolice +82.3% 5.258
government official *** (o.o51) (1-315)
Recipient is a police officer *** +75.1% 4.711
(0.074) (o.814)
Statement is made during abuse +65.8% 3.158
counseling *** (0.175) (1.233)
Statement is made during a 911 +40.7% 1.980
call ** (0.191) (0.874)
Recipient of the statement is a +39.7% 1.881
health professional ** (0.214) (0.938)
Statement is audio- or video- +26.2% 1.434
recorded (0.160) (0.797)
Statement is made during the -13.9% -1.272
commission of the offense (o.o58) (0.744)
Statement is made while a party -18.2% -1.437
is injured *** (0.051) (0.443)
Statement is an excited -21.1% -1.628
utterance *** (o.o55) (0.433)
Statement is a business or -21.2% -3.874
government record *** (0.043) (1-390)
This table presents the results from a stepwise logistic regression. Three variable
selection processes - stepwise regression, forward elimination, and backward
elimination-all yielded the same set of variables, which had a statistically significant
correlation with a statement being found testimonial at the .15 level or better. Standard
errors for each term are in parentheses below the term. All listed variables are
statistically significant at the .1o level. Variables with ** are significant at the .o5 level
and variables with *** are significant at the .o level.
What conclusions can we draw from the regression results? First, state
action matters. A lot. A given statement is almost twice as likely to be found to
be testimonial, all else equal, when it is made to a state actor. The fact that the
recipient of a statement is either a police officer or a nonpolice government
official (for example, a fire marshal, prosecutor, or judge) substantially
increases the likelihood that a court will find that statement to be testimonial.
This is consistent with the descriptive statistics in Section II.B. It is also
consistent with the scholars and lower courts who have emphasized the
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Confrontation Clause as a protection against abuses of state power. 20 It is even
consistent with the subtext of Crawford and the history of confrontation abuses
in England.' State action, however, has only been explicitly emphasized by
the Court in Bryant.1 2 And even Bryant only made a comparative statement of
priority; it did not state that the Confrontation Clause is exclusively or nearly
exclusively concerned with statements made to state actors.
State v. Parker, a case decided by Tennessee's Court of Criminal Appeals,
demonstrates the important role of state action in Confrontation Clause
cases.21' There, the victim of a home invasion was sexually assaulted and fled to
her neighbor's house.1 She recounted her attack to her neighbor, who dialed
911.21s The police arrived several minutes later and questioned the victim,
whose statements were "parallel[]" to those she had initially made to her
neighbor.21' Hours later, the victim told a nurse at the hospital that her son's
friend had attacked her."' The Parker court, after reciting an eight-factor test
for testimonial statements, concisely noted that "[s]tatements describing past
events to law enforcement officers are testimonial" except "when [those]
statements . . . are meant to assist the officers in meeting an ongoing
emergency. "2,8 On that basis, the court held that the victim's statements to her
neighbor, a nonstate actor, were nontestimonial while nearly identical
statements made by the same victim minutes later were testimonial because
they were made in response to police questioning. 9
Second, some of the results are quite consistent with Davis's emphasis on
emergency response. For example, statements made during a crime-in the
midst of an emergency with uncertain outcomes -are slightly less likely to be
found to be testimonial. The same is true of statements held to be excited
utterances and those made while a party is injured.
210. See infra Section III.B.
211. Id.
212. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011) ("[T]he most important instances in which
the Clause restricts the introduction of out-of-court statements are those in which state
actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for
trial.").
213. No. E20o8-02 54 1-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3706090 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 22, 2010), affd
in relevant part, 350 S.W. 3d 883 (Tenn. 2011).
214. Id. at *1-2.
215. Id.
216. Id. at *2, *16.
217. Id. at *5.
218. Id. at *15.
219. Id. at *15-18.
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Several results are more ambiguous. For example, statements made during
911 calls are forty percent more likely to be testimonial. This makes some sense,
because 911 operators are state agents, although they are not police officers.2o
Without controlling for other factors, 911 operators confront courts with
conflicting indicators. They are state actors, yet they act, almost by definition,
during emergencies. Regression isolates the effect of a 911 operator,
independent of the emergency during which the operator acts. The data
suggest that courts recognize 911 operators as state actors. This fact can be
hidden because so many 911 calls occur during medical emergencies, but when
one controls for that effect, the emphasis that courts place on state action
becomes clear."'
The results for health professionals are also somewhat ambiguous. The
abuse-counseling results seem to fit the state-action theory. Courts are often
critical of social workers' interviews of children because they view these
interviews as means to collect evidence,m' and because the interviews
sometimes occur at the instigation of the police. That skepticism might also
partly explain the result for other health professionals. Health professionals
include not only EMTs and doctors but also SANE nurses. As explained above,
these professionals draw greater scrutiny from courts.2
State v. Steele, decided by the Ohio Court of Appeals, illustrates the complex
interplay of medical emergencies, police interrogations, and discussions with
health professionals."* Police arrived at the apartment of Virginia Austin to
find her lying on the ground, partially disrobed and crying.22s She had also
been struck on the head.22 6 Austin told the officers that that she had been
assaulted. 7 The police called an ambulance, and Austin told the arriving EMT
22o. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823 n.2 (2006) (noting that 911 operators are agents
of law enforcement when they are questioning 911 callers).
za. See, e.g., State v. Camarena, 176 P.3d 380, 387-88 (Or. 2008) (holding that the first half of a
911 call was nontestimonial but the second half of the call was testimonial because the
questions and responses "were directed at establishing facts only relevant to a subsequent
criminal action").
222. See, e.g., State v. Bentley, 739 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 2007) (describing in detail how interviews
by the Child Protection Center are testimonial because they are formal and intertwined with
the evidence-gathering functions of the police).
223. See supra note 20o and accompanying text.
224. No. 91571, 2009 WL 2894472 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. io, 2oo9).
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that she had been attacked"'S and repeated that statement to the police." 9
Finally, Austin gave a more detailed report to police at the hospital.23o The
court applied the "primary purpose" test to hold that Austin's initial statement
to the police was nontestimonial; there was an ongoing emergency when she
first spoke."' Her subsequent statements to police, however, were made after
the medical emergency had passed and were therefore testimonial.' Although
Austin's statement to the EMT was nearly contemporaneous with her second
statement to the police, the court applied the "objective witness" test to the
nonpolice EMT and thus held that statement to be nontestimonial.3
To summarize, the regression results show that two considerations
matter-and in a specific, ordered way. First, statements made to nonstate
actors are almost never testimonial statements. If a statement is not made to a
police officer, government official, 911 operator, or mandatory reporter (such
as a doctor or SANE nurse), the Confrontation Clause usually does not apply.
Second, assuming the statement is made to a state actor, courts consider
factors showing an emergency. The greater the indication of a medical or
public safety emergency, the more likely courts are to find a statement to be
nontestimonial. Those two factors - a state actor and the presence of an
emergency -do not perfectly predict every case outcome. But they explain most
outcomes.
D. Limitations of the Data
Like all regression analysis and content analysis of judicial opinions, my
data are subject to limitations. As explained above, using stepwise regression
eased sample-size problems, but the sample size was still less than ideal. 3' A
related concern, multicollinearity of the independent variables, was not a
problem.' Multicollinearity refers to high correlation among independent
variables. As an example, multicollinearity might confound a researcher
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at *2.
231. Id. at *4.
232. Id. at *5, *7.
233. Id. at *5-6,
234. See supra note 207.
235. See ARTHUR S. GOLDBERGER, A COURSE IN ECONOMETIUCS 248-51 (1991) (noting that the
consequences of a small sample size are exactly as serious and have the same
effect - increased variance of the parameter estimates - as multicollinearity).
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attempting to estimate the effects of GPA and LSAT scores on law school
admissions. Because higher LSAT scores and higher GPAs may frequently
occur together, teasing out the effect of a change in one factor or the other
could be difficult. The effect of multicollinearity is the same as the effect of a
small sample size: it reduces the statistical significance of the regression
coefficients for a given sample size and specification."' Both multicollinearity
and small-sample-size problems do not bias the results in one direction or
another. Rather, their effects are to reduce the confidence a researcher can have
in her estimates. No variable here had a variance inflation factor (VIF) greater
than three, while multicollinearity is usually a problem only with VIF scores of
greater than ten.37
Sample-selection bias is also unlikely to be a problem. Sample-selection
bias occurs when the sampling procedures yield a sample that is not
representative of the population being analyzed."' In this case, the population
is lower-court decisions in Confrontation Clause cases. The only criterion for
selection was citing Davis. I chose Davis rather than Crawford for two reasons.
First, Davis was decided two years after Crawford. Thus, lower courts had had
time to adjust to the Supreme Court's new Confrontation Clause framework.
Second, Davis helped resolve some common but ambiguous fact patterns (911
calls and excited utterances), but it also heightened important ambiguities in
the Crawford line. 3 9 Because Davis, unlike Crawford, dealt with domestic
violence and 911 calls, it is possible that domestic violence cases could be
overrepresented in the sample because courts would be less likely to cite Davis
in other types of cases. This possibility seems unlikely (but not completely
improbable). In my experience reading cases and developing the coding
mechanisms, most courts seriously considering Confrontation Clause cases cite
both Davis and Crawford. There is one small possibility of selection bias,
stemming from the difference between the sampling unit and the unit of
analysis. While I sampled cases, I analyzed statements. Thus, statements from
cases where the court evaluated several statements would be slightly
underrepresented. This would only matter if statements contained in cases
236. Id. at 248-52.
237. See Robert M. O'Brien, A Caution Regarding Rules of Thumb for Variance Inflation Factors, 41
QUAUTY & QUANTITY 673, 674 & n.2. (2007) ("Not uncommonly a VIF of lo or even one as
low as 4 . . . have been used as rules of thumb to indicate excessive or serious multi-
collinearity."); see also JAMES P. STEVENS, INTERMEDIATE STATISTICS: A MODERN APPROACH
235 ( 3d ed. 2007) (discussing the rule often for VIF).
238. See James J. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error, 47 ECONOMETRICA 153,
153 (1979) (modeling sample selection bias).
239. See supra Section I.C.
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with multiple statements systematically differed from other statements. I do
not believe there is any particular reason that would be true.
A more substantial concern is coding reliability. The coding rules are
explained in Appendix A. These rules are generally objective. For example, a
court says a statement is either testimonial or is not testimonial-if the court
does not give any indication on that issue, then the case was excluded.
Similarly, a statement was or was not made during a 911 call. At the same time,
I did have to make a few judgment calls during the coding process.o The only
variable that raised a concern of consistently requiring subjective evaluation
was the "injured party" variable. This variable was too important to drop, so I
developed an alternative and more objective coding method. Instead of judging
whether an injury was medically serious, the alternative coding treated
stabbings and shootings one way, and other physical injuries another way.
Although reliable and consistent coding is important, some inconsistency or
uncertainty is not fatal. For example, seventy-five to eighty percent agreement
between coders is generally considered acceptable in content analyses.4' After I
completed my analysis, several students, unfamiliar with my coding or results,
recoded a sample of the cases. Their results indicated that the initial coding is
relatively reliable. The details and results of this reliability check are explained
in Appendix B.
A final troubling problem is endogeneity. Endogeneity could refer to one of
two problems. First, reverse causality could occur if an independent variable
not only causes a dependent variable (for example, a 911 call causes an
increased probability that the statement will be found to be testimonial) but is
also caused by the dependent variable. That is unlikely here for the simple
reason of time. The properties of a statement occur first, and the statement is
classified as testimonial later by a reviewing court. That review cannot change
the prior events. A second form of endogeneity, omitted-variable bias, is more
troubling. There is no test for omitted-variable bias. While I have attempted to
test for the factors reflected in the Crawford-line decisions, it is possible that
other facts about each case-the characteristics of the offender and victim, the
heinousness of the charged crime, and the strength of other evidence -have a
role to play. It is quite difficult to code for some of these variables. To the
extent that one has a coherent theory about why they would matter, evaluating
their effects is a project for future researchers.
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240. For a particularly frustrating case requiring that I determine how to code a veterinarian, see
Holz v. State, No. o6-o 9 -oo172-CR, 2010 WL 1041o68 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2010).
241. See NEUENDORF, supra note 194, at 143.
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III. ANALYSIS
This Part offers a normative take on the data presented in Part II. I offer
two primary arguments. First, critics have exaggerated the incoherence of
Crawford in the lower courts. Even if the Court has failed to clarify its doctrine,
lower courts have responded admirably, bringing consistency to Confrontation
Clause doctrine. Second, lower courts have been not only consistent but also
correct in how they have approached the Confrontation Clause. By focusing on
the state's investigatory power, lower courts have captured not only the
concerns that animated the adoption of the Clause, but also the deep concerns
of Crawford itself.
A. The Confrontation Clause, Consistently
Crawford and its progeny have a problem of doctrinal vagueness. Part I
explained how certain statements might or might not be testimonial depending
on the definition applied by the courts. Scholars have argued the same point.24'
Courts have emphasized those concerns as well.w3 The result, according to
critics, is that lower courts are left unable to make heads or tails of the
Confrontation Clause.'" This problem is exacerbated, according to a much
smaller group of scholars, by the politically motivated desires of some courts to
seize on any excuse for diminishing the scope of the Confrontation Clause."s
The results presented in this Note suggest that problems with Crawford's
242. See sources cited supra notes 11-18, 25; see also Isley Markman, The Admission of Hearsay
Testimony Under the Doctrine ofForfeiture-by-Wrongdoing in Domestic Violence Cases: Advice for
Prosecutors and Courts, CRIM. L. BluEF, Spring 2011, at 9 ("The Crawford decision failed to
provide a clear definition of'testimonial."').
243. See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3 d 53, 55 (ist Cir. 2005) ("Crawford ... produced a miasma
of uncertainty.").
244. See Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (Crone, J., concurring in the
result) (noting that "fallout from Justice Scalia's 'clarification' of the Confrontation Clause
in Crawford will reverberate through the evidentiary landscape for some time to come and
will create countless dilemmas for trial and appellate courts"), vacated, 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind.
2005); Markman, supra note 242, at 12 ("[Lower] courts read the vague Davis standard to
admit a significant amount of hearsay evidence as non-testimonial and therefore as
unaffected by Crawford.").
245. See Cicchini, supra note 7, at 1320 (noting that "lower courts continued to abuse their
discretion" in the wake of Davis); Cicchini, supra note 12, at 754-55 (arguing for a
"bright-line" Confrontation Clause test as the "only viable solution to the problem of
judicial manipulation" by judges who do not "honestly attempt to uphold the
Constitution"); Ross, supra note 25, at 449-57 (describing how lower courts "strain[] the
leash" by pushing the limits of ambiguous Confrontation Clause doctrine).
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vagueness, coherence, and consistent applicability have been exaggerated. The
evidence presented in Part II indicates that lower courts effectively engage4 6 in
a bifurcated analysis. The first step is relatively clear. Courts ask whether the
recipient of a challenged statement was a state actor. If the answer is no, then
the Confrontation Clause is almost never relevant. If the answer is yes, and the
recipient is a state actor, then step two applies. In step two, lower courts
consider the circumstances surrounding the challenged statement. The most
important circumstance appears to be the existence of an emergency, especially
a medical emergency, a result entirely consistent with Davis. The objective
factors present in any case thus have significant predictive power. Knowing
whether a statement is made to a police officer or a friend1 7 or whether a
nearby party is injured"' tells us a lot about how a court will classify that
statement. If Crawford were truly the mess that critics claim," 9 no factors
should have much success in predicting case outcomes.
Critics might respond that there is another way to read my results. We can
predict a great deal just from the involvement of a state actor and a medical
emergency, but we cannot predict everything. Or nearly everything. And if
many cases are unexplained by the data, doesn't that mean Crawford is
doctrinally problematic?
I think this response demands too much. Judges are not computers, and
judging is not computing. Crawford challenges involve guessing about
subjective motivation (why did the police officer ask a question?), grading the
seriousness of a problem (just how bad was the victim's injury?), and assessing
the objective risk to a community. Since subjective assessment cannot be
quantitatively measured, one cannot use it to statistically predict case
outcomes. But that sort of uncertainty is not unfair to litigants. Litigants need
246. 1 say "effectively engage" because most courts are not following these steps explicitly.
Rather, courts are resolving Confrontation Clause challenges as if they had followed this
process. An analogy from welfare economics might be familiar to some readers. Economists
generally recognize that consumers do not consciously think about maximizing utility when
they make consumption choices, but they may nonetheless behave as though they were
rational utility-maximizers. WALTER NICHOLSON & CHRISTOPHER SNYDER,
MICROECONOMIc THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 92 (8th ed. 2002) ("[T]he
utility-maximization model predicts many aspects of behavior even though no one carries
around a computer with his or her utility function programmed into it. To be precise,
economists assume that people behave as ifthey made such calculations.. . .").
247. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (contrasting testimonial, formal
statements to government officials with nontestimonial, casual remarks to a friend).
248. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160-62 (2011) (describing the role of injury in
determining whether a statement is testimonial).
249. See supra notes 242-245.
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to know what questions the court will ask and what evidence is relevant. The
results in Part II provide litigants with good answers to those questions. They
should argue about the role of a state actor in procuring a statement and the
existence of a medical emergency.
I do not deny that outliers exist. In a few cases, courts probably got it
wrong.2 so But a focus on selected individual cases can obscure the important
large-scale patterns."' Lower courts sometimes flout the Supreme Court's
stated doctrine, but practitioners and scholars should be concerned with the
grand run of cases rather than curious outliers.5  When one considers that
larger population of Confrontation Clause cases, the results are more
encouraging. Critics overstate the issue when they call the state of affairs
"arbitrary"13 or "confusing."54
B. Lower-Court Decisions and the Meaning of Confrontation
Accepting my results, a different set of critics might respond that if lower
courts have converged, they have converged at the wrong site. Lower courts
may have adopted a common framework for Confrontation Clause challenges,
but this framework is wrong -either as a matter of history or when measured
against Crawford's reasoning.
As explained above," courts applying Crawford look first for the presence
of a state actor, and second for the presence of a medical emergency in deciding
whether a statement is testimonial. In other words, the Confrontation Clause
250. See, e.g., People v. Blacksher, 259 P-3 d 370, 410-11 (Cal. 2011) (holding that a statement
"made while [the declarant] was in a police car, in the presence of a city mental health
worker, and with multiple officers nearby" was nontestimonial); Crawford v.
Commonwealth, 686 S.E.2d 557, 567-69 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a civil protective
order affidavit was nontestimonial); Ross, supra note 25, at 443-49 (citing cases where courts
have selectively emphasized statements in Crawford and Davis to minimize Confrontation
Clause protections).
251. Levine, supra note 190, at 300 (arguing that although theories from a "small series of cases"
can be "thought-provoking," they rarely provide a "robust explanation of how the law
works").
252. See Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 813-15 (1999)
(arguing that empirical research allows scholars to "better maintain neutrality," leading to
more accurate descriptions of the legal system and sounder normative theories); cf Hall &
Wright, supra note 193, at 79-80 (explaining how the approach of systematically reading a
representative sample of cases differs from the conventional "leading case" approach).
253. Raeder, supra note 16, at 775-76.
254. Etter, supra note 13, at 1168.
255. See supra Section III.A.
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applies most stringently to statements made to state actors acting in their
investigative capacity. It applies less stringently to state actors acting in their
emergency-response or public-safety capacity, and rarely to nonstate actors.
This theory already has scholarly support.25 Proponents argue that
without confrontation, state actors can manipulate evidence in both production
and presentation to obtain a politically motivated or otherwise false
conviction.s 7 This theory also has a historical foundation: the concern of the
Framers with the abuses of inquisitorial-style prosecutions in England, such as
the Star Chamber and the trial of Raleigh.2s Moreover, this interpretation is
textually plausible. The Confrontation Clause is situated among other
constitutional protections that can be read, as a whole, to form a bulwark
against government abuses. 9 And the Clause applies only to criminal trials as
a protection for the accused, not for the government.260
This theory reflects the underlying principles of Crawford. The Crawford
majority extensively detailed the history of English abuses and the early
American concern with the civil ex parte mode of examination."' And, "[i]t is
only after this discussion that the Court set forth its three formulations of
testimonial hearsay." ,, 6  Crawford's three definitions and Davis's definitions
thus play a distinctly secondary role in how we should properly read the
decision. They are illuminative or exemplary. They should be read through the
lens of the history. The definitions "should [be] construe[d] [as] three
formulations . . . directed at the same concern: preventing the government
from using hearsay statements at trial if the statements were obtained through
a method that resembles a civil-law mode of interrogation. ,263
256. See Berger, supra note 69; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A
Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1048 (1998) ("[T]he Constitution is mainly
addressed to state action . . . . The Sixth Amendment is triggered when [a defendant] is
'accused' by the state . . . .").
257. Berger, supra note 69, at 586 ("Confrontation was part of an arsenal designed ... to restrain
the government in criminal trials from acting in a covert, repugnant manner that would be
concealed from the people.").
258. Id. at 568-81 (describing the English antecedents and roots of the Confrontation Clause and
the way that history influenced the Framers).
259. Id. at 560-63.
260. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
261. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-56 (2004).
262. United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 68 (1st Cir. 2005) (Howard, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52).
263. Id.; see also People v. Hurtado, No. Fo47195, 20o6 WL 1364999, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. May
19, 2006) (stating that Crawford's three definitions should be read not as distinct but as
sharing a common goal to exclude civil ex parte examinations).
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Scholars, and sometimes courts, have a tendency to overread Crawford's
definitions. For example, if one adopts the "objective witness" definition, it is
natural to view almost every interaction between private citizens and law
enforcement as testimonial. After all, anything a person says to the police that
is uncoerced can potentially end up in court.264 For this reason, defense
attorneys often advise clients to say nothing to the police. And one would
therefore think that every statement to the police would, objectively, be
expected to be used in a criminal trial. However, if one reads the "objective
witness" definition purposively, with the purpose being the exclusion of ex
parte examinations, then lower-court decisions make more sense. All
statements to police officers might end up in court. But not all statements to
police officers are ex parte examinations.
A person not speaking to a state actor is almost never participating in
anything like a civil ex parte examination. Thus the distinct role of state action
in lower-court decisions. Moreover, a police officer who arrives at the scene of
an emergency and tends to a wounded victim has little resemblance to an
interrogator. By contrast, SANE nurses are trained to collect evidence and
assess sexual assault. Their structured questioning has much more in common
with the ex parte examinations that concerned the Framers than does the
conduct of a police officer who arrives along with the ambulance. Lower courts,
by excluding testimony from SANE nurses, or by excluding post-Miranda
statements but including statements to first-responding police, are hewing
closely to Crawford's contours.
Scholars often want Crawford to stand for a favored principle - a generically
strong Confrontation Clause,26s the need for evidence to be reliable,266 or a
repudiation of judicial discretion in confrontation decisions6 -without
allowing the decision to stand on its own terms. The Court was not trying to
compromise competing interests or gesture nebulously in the direction of
robust or weak confrontation rights. Crawford provided a specific protection to
defendants to confront, live and in court, accusers who make testimonial
statements against them. Defendants can ask for no more, and the government
can provide no less. This may or may not provide more protection on the
whole than the pre-Crawford regime. But it is a mistake to attack lower courts
264. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) ("[A]nything said can and will be used
against the individual in court.").
265. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of "Testimonial," 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 241, 273-74 (2005).
266. See, e.g., Josephine Ross, What's Reliability Got To Do with the Confrontation Clause After
Crawford?, 14 WIDENERL. REv. 383, 384-85, 403-05 (2009).
267. See, e.g., Cicchini, supra note 7, at 1316-20.
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for failing to provide defendants with robust protection. The courts are, by and
large, providing defendants exactly the protection the Constitution requires.
CONCLUSION
This Note is one of the first attempts to understand empirically how lower
courts have applied Crawford. The Crawford line of cases made a clear doctrinal
break with Roberts. Post-Crawford doctrine, however, has not been terribly
clear. Indeed, the doctrine has appeared contradictory at times. Lower courts
could theoretically achieve different outcomes by stressing different elements
of the doctrine. Scholars have cited these facts to argue that lower courts can
effectively ignore Crawford and pursue their own policy preferences. Moreover,
even lower courts that act in good faith and try to comply with Crawford can
still issue inconsistent outcomes.
This Note investigated the lower courts empirically. I presented data
showing that lower-court decisions are not random or arbitrary, as Crawford's
critics would suggest. Instead, two factors -whether a statement is made to a
state actor and whether a statement is made during a medical emergency -
undergird the actions of lower courts. Not every lower-court decision can be
predicted entirely by absolutely objective variables. But the grand run of lower-
court Confrontation Clause decisions is far from arbitrary or unpredictable.
Finally, I argued that lower courts are not only deciding Confrontation
Clause challenges consistently, but they are also doing so in a manner that
squares with the text and history of the Confrontation Clause, and with the
Crawford Court's theory of that Clause. Lower courts are regulating the state's
coercive power, and they are doing so in those circumstances in which Crawford
calls for them to do so.
268. Cf Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 67 (2004) ("[The Confrontation Clause]
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. . . . The Constitution prescribes a
procedure for determining the reliability of testimony in criminal trials, and we, no less than
the state courts, lack authority to replace it with one of our own devising."). I quote Justice
Scalia's point extensively because it is a fitting and decisively less pro-defense statement
than scholars assume. When lower courts admit evidence that scholars perceive to be
unreliable, they often argue that these courts are circumventing Crawford. But Justice
Scalia's language shows the flaw in this reasoning. The Clause prevents the government
from introducing testimonial statements without allowing cross-examination, but it also
provides defendants with no guarantees that they will be able to cross-examine declarants
whose statements were made in nontestimonial circumstances. This is true even when those
statements are probably unreliable.
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VARIABLE CODED I IF ... CODEDO IF...
Irrelevant (1) The opinion did not address the The opinion evaluated a
Confrontation Clause, (2) the opinion was a Confrontation Clause challenge,
nonbinding magistrate judge including if the opinion stated how
recommendation, or (3) the opinion did not the court viewed the matter but
rule on or offer an opinion on a ruled primarily on harmless error
Confrontation Clause challenge, or another procedural question.
Testimonial The statement was held by the court to be Otherwise.
testimonial, including if the court said the
statement was likely testimonial but did not
resolve the issue with certainty.
During The statement was made during commission Otherwise, including statements
of the charged crimes, or immediately after made between overt acts of a
the crimes were completed. conspiracy.
Before The statement was made before the Otherwise.
commission of any of the charged crimes.
911 The statement was made during a 911 call or Otherwise, including if (s) the
was a Computer-Aided Dispatch report of a statement was a classification of a
951 call. 911 call by a 911 operator or (2) the
statement was a report of a 911
dispatcher to a police officer.
Police The statement was made at (i) a police Otherwise.
Station/Court station, (2) a courthouse, or (3) another
government building.
Abuse The statement was made at a facility for Otherwise, including if the
treatment of sexual abuse or domestic abuse statement was made at a hospital
during an interview by a trained or other general medical
professional. establishment.
Medical The statement was made (s) in a medical Otherwise.
record, (2) in medical notes that do not
formally qualify as a medical record, or (3)
during medical treatment.
Recorded The statement was audio- or video- Otherwise.
recorded. 911 calls were coded as 1 unless the
opinion explicitly indicated to the contrary.
Dying Declaration The statement was found to be a dying Otherwise.
declaration.*
Excited Utterance The statement was found to be an excited Otherwise.
utterance.*
Present Sense The statement was found to be a present Otherwise.
Impression sense impression.*
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Table 5 continued.
VARIABLE CODED1IF... CODED0IF...
Government/ The statement was found to be a Otherwise.
Business Record government or business record.* Forensic
analyses and laboratory reports were coded
as i unless the opinion explicitly indicated to
the contrary.
Cop The statement was made to a police officer Otherwise, including business or
other than a 911 operator or an undercover government records not kept with
agent. Certificates of no report and forensic specific police involvement (such as
analyses were coded as i unless the opinion DMV records).
explicitly indicated to the contrary.
Doctor The statement was made to a health Otherwise, including if the
professional including a doctor, nurse, or statement was made to a veterinarian
EMT. If multiple parties were present, the or social worker.
statement was coded as a s if a health
professional was present.
Government The statement was made to a government Otherwise.
official other than a police officer or 911
operator.
Victim Speaking The declarant of the statement was the The declarant of the statement was
victim of the crimes charged in the case, not the victim of the crimes charged
where the crime charged had a defined in the case, including crimes that
victim. Those crimes included murder, were treated as having no
assault, battery, robbery, and criminal identifiable victim: drug crimes,
sexual conduct. financial crimes, record-keeping
violations, and crimes not resulting
in bodily contact with another
person.
Injured- Declarant or a known nearby party was (1) Otherwise, including if a party was
Specification A shot or stabbed, or (2) treated by emergency injured but not seriously enough to
medical technicians or treated at a hospital warrant medical treatment. Absent
for injuries, and those injuries were other physical injury, sexual assaults
medically serious. and rapes were coded as o.
Injured- Declarant or a known nearby party was shot Otherwise, including in cases of
Specification B or stabbed. Coded as 0.5 if declarant or a sexual assault or rape without other
known nearby party was physically battered injury.
but not shot or stabbed.
* For all hearsay codings, I applied several rules: (1) absent some indication in the
opinion, briefing, or lower-court opinions that the court applied an exception, I coded
the variables as o; (2) I coded the variables as i if the trial court held the statement to
fall within the relevant hearsay exception so long as the reviewing court did not
overturn that holding; and (3) I coded closely labeled state equivalents for the same




CONFRONTING CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON IN THE LOWER COURTS
APPENDIX 8: INTERCODER RELIABILITY
During the editing process, I checked the reliability of my initial coding of
the cases. Approximately eighty statements from the sample, or slightly less
than one-third, were recoded by individuals who did not know the original
results. I then compared the results of the recoding to my initial coding, using
Cohen's Kappa16 , to measure the level of agreement. Cohen's Kappa is one of
several measurements designed to account for chance agreement between
coders.2 7o Accounting for chance is particularly important in this case, because
certain fact patterns, such as a dying declaration, occur infrequently. Thus,
agreement by chance will be quite common even if coders are guessing
(provided that they are guessing with roughly the same distributions of
responses).
Table 6 lists values of Cohen's Kappa for each variable. Unfortunately,
there is no general agreement about the level of agreement required. Whereas
some scholars suggest that only values greater than 0.7 or o.8 are acceptable,
others accept values as low as 0.4.-7
Variables listed in the left-hand column are identical to those listed in Table
3, but are listed in descending order based on the value of Cohen's Kappa.
Values in the right-hand column have been rounded to three digits.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the reliability analysis. First, coding
for many of the important variables is fairly reliable. Those variables most
important to the analysis-for example, the dependent variable or that a
statement is made to a police officer - had high Cohen's Kappa values.
Second, some variables are less reliable, and a few (the temporal variables
during and before, and the abuse counseling variable) are downright
untrustworthy. Fortunately, the least reliable variables were relatively
unimportant to the descriptive analysis of Section II.B. Several more important
variables, however, were also less than ideally reliable. In particular, the
government actor (nonpolice) and injury variables both had Kappa values less
than 0.6. These low values are not fatal to my analysis, but they do make the
results a bit more tentative.
269. See Jacob Cohen, A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales, 20 EDUC. & PSYCHOL.
MEASUREMENT 37, 40 (1960) (proposing K as a measure of "the proportion of agreement
[between two coders of a nominal variable] after chance agreement is removed from
consideration").
270. See NEUENDORF, supra note 194, at 150.
271. See id. at 143.
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Table 6.
VALUES OF COHEN'S KAPPA
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Finally, it is worth noting that the alternative specification of an injury was
in fact far more reliable than the initial definition with a Cohen's Kappa value
of nearly o.8, versus a value of o.6 for the initial definition.
There are also reasons to be somewhat cautious about the reliability
analysis itself. First, the recoders had fairly little training. It is possible that
some of the disagreements between their recoding and the original coding may
be due to misinterpretation of a rule. Second, certain variables occurred
relatively infrequently in the data. Thus, the reliability analysis would show
chance agreement to be common, and even a low number of disagreements
could produce a very low Kappa. This, for example, is the case with the
nonpolice government agent variable and the abuse counseling variable.
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